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No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term 1984

JAMES B. JENSEN, JR.; RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation; and HAMIX INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a corporation

Petitioners

vs.

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION

Respondents

On Appeal from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

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66 pp

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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1. Is the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Petitioners consistent with the standards set forth in *International Shoe Company v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny? More specifically, since the contacts of the Defendants (Petitioners) with the forum state are similar to those of the defendants in *Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall*, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984), and the claims in the lawsuit no more directly related to those contacts, do the claims "arise out of" the contacts for purposes of specific jurisdiction over the persons of the Defendants?

2. Do the contacts by one (corporate) Defendant with the forum state give the District Court jurisdiction over the persons of other Defendants?

3. If the Court of Appeals merely says it is applying an "abuse of

discretion" standard when reviewing the decision of the District Court conditionally dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint on *forum non conveniens* grounds, may the Court of Appeals then conduct its own *de novo* review of the facts?

PARTIES

The parties to the proceeding in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals whose judgment Petitioners seek to have reviewed are as follows: Learjet Philippines, Inc.; James B. Jensen and Company, Inc.; James Jensen, Jr.;* Ricardo Tomacruz, and Hamix International, Ltd. (Petitioners), and Gates Learjet Corporation and Gates Learjet Export Corporation (Respondents, sometimes referred to as Plaintiffs).

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* Respondents have misnamed Mr. Jensen, adding a "B." to his name, perhaps confusing him with the company that was started by (and bears) his late father's name.

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OPINION BELOW

The Decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is reported at 743 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1984).

DATES OF DECISIONS BELOW

The judgment of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals of which review is sought was entered on September 27, 1984 (Appendix 4).

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied Petitioners' Motion for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing en Banc on November 27, 1984 (Appendix 5).

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

This Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on this Petition for Writ of Certiorari under 28 U.S.C. §2101.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals violates Petitioners' right to due process of law guaranteed by

the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the pertinent part of which states, "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; . . ."

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS

In the Summer of 1981, after asking for and receiving from Learjet Philippines, Inc. ("LPI"), LPI's marketing plan (identifying the potential customers for the future sale of Learjets in the Republic of the Philippines), Respondents notified LPI that LPI would no longer be acting as distributor for Respondents' products (Learjets) in the Republic of the Philippines. During the period 1978 until April 1981, LPI worked under written contract with Gates Learjet Export Corporation ("GLEC") (a wholly-owned subsidiary of Gates Learjet Corporation ("GLC")), to act as distributor for Learjet in the Philippines. After April 1981, LPI continued to work under an oral agreement with GLEC until the Notice of Termination on October 15, 1981. In November 1981, Respondents sent a salesman with a demonstrator airplane to the Philippines to

attempt to complete some of the sales LPI had been working on before it received the Notice of Termination. Respondents neglected to obtain the proper licenses from the Philippine authorities to do business there. When their employee and plane arrived, both were seized (under a complaint sworn by Ricardo Tomacruz). Bond was posted and the salesman and airplane were released pending trial. The criminal action is still pending.

LPI filed an action against Respondents in the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch, Republic of the Philippines, on December 1, 1981. That complaint alleged, in substance, that Respondents had attempted "to take advantage of the beneficial results of Plaintiff's sacrifices, efforts and expenses" without paying and that Respondents had damaged LPI's business reputation in the Philippines. Respondents

answered and counterclaimed for malicious prosecution.

On December 10, 1981, Petitioners Ricardo S. Tomacruz and James Jensen, Jr., filed suit in the Court of First Instance, Cabanatuan City, Republic of the Philippines against Respondents and three individuals: Bermar S. Stillwell, John Benson and Michael F. Fahey.

This action was originally filed by Gates Learjet Corporation and Gates Learjet Export Corporation in the Superior Court of Pima County, Arizona, on February 3, 1982. Since there was complete diversity of citizenship of the parties, the Defendants removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona by filing a Petition for Removal and Bond on March 15, 1982. The District Court had jurisdiction to hear the cause under 28 U.S.C. §§1331 and 1442.

On motion of Defendants, the Honorable Alfredo C. Marquez, United States District Judge for the District of Arizona, dismissed Counts II and III of Plaintiffs' Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person of James B. Jensen and Company, Inc., on September 23, 1982[1] (Appendix 1). The subject matter of the four counts of Plaintiffs' Complaint is of some importance and will be discussed below.

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[1] At the time the motions were filed which gave rise to the September 23, 1982, Order, only Defendant James B. Jensen and Company, Inc., was before the court. The other Defendants had not yet been served. Thereafter, on April 20, 1983, defendants James Jensen, Jr., Ricardo Tomacruz and Hamix International, Inc., filed their Motion to Dismiss. On May 31, 1983, by Minute Entry Order, Judge Marquez clarified his Order of September 23, 1982, as follows:

> "Court's order of September 23, 1982, is clarified to reflect that Counts II and III are dismissed as to all parties named in those counts." Appendix 2.

Since the Complaint was not entirely dismissed,[2] Defendants filed their Answer to Counts I and IV, together with counterclaims against the Plaintiffs (and others). Although the counterclaims will not be described in detail, they were compulsory[3] to the Plaintiffs' Complaint, inasmuch as they arose out of the same transactions which gave rise to Plaintiffs' Complaint. They will not be described in detail, as they are not material to this Petition.

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2 The September 23, 1982, Order ended by saying, "It is ordered that defendant Jensen, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is denied as to counts I and IV and granted as to counts II and III."

3 As the District Court found. The Court of Appeals found that, although some of the counterclaims arguably were permissive, since Petitioners continued to challenge the court's jurisdiction over them, the counterclaims did not amount to a waiver of the jurisdictional defenses. 743 F.2d 1325.

After substantial discovery was done as to Counts I and IV,[4] and as to Defendants' counterclaims, Defendants moved on October 5, 1983, for an order virtually identical to the order in *Cheng v. Boeing Company*, 708 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1983), conditionally dismissing Counts I and IV of the Complaint (and all but one of the counterclaims), so those claims could be tried

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[4] It is significant that the District Judge first dismissed Counts II and III (the malicious prosecution and interference with contractual relations counts). It was with the knowledge that those claims would have to be tried in the Philippines *anyway*, that the District Judge viewed the Motion to Dismiss Counts I and IV on grounds of *forum non conveniens*. The Ninth Circuit's *de novo* review of the facts supporting the dismissal for *forum non conveniens* of Counts I and IV does not take into account that the discovery on Counts II and III has not been done and that virtually *all* of the witnesses as to Counts II and III are located in the Philippines. This failure to apply what might be called the "distributive property" of review makes the Court of Appeals' conclusions regarding the private and public interest factors regarding the *forum non conveniens* dismissal appear to have a better basis in fact than they actually do.

in the more convenient forum: the Republic of the Philippines.

On November 1, 1983, after carefully reviewing the private and public interest factors at stake, in light of this Court's decisions in *Gulf Oil Corporation v. Gilbert*, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); *Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co.*, 330 U.S. 518 (1947), and *Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), the District

Court conditionally dismissed[5] the remaining counts of the Complaint (Appendix 3).

On November 16, 1983, on Order of the District Judge, the clerk entered final (partial) judgment as to Counts I and IV of Plaintiffs' Complaint and all but one of the counterclaims. On November 29, 1983,

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[5] The conditions were virtually identical to those in *Cheng v. Boeing Company, supra:*

> "(a) That the courts of the Philippines accept jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs' claims; (b) that the defendants submit to the jurisdiction of the appropriate court of the Philippines; (c) that the defendants make their employees available as witnesses in the Philippines; (d) that defendants waive any statute of limitations defenses which might have arisen during the pendency of the actions in this court; (e) that defendants recognize any judgment rendered by a court in the Philippines; (f) all discovery and the products may be used in any action in the Philippines - subject to objections which could be made in this court." Appendix 3.

the District Judge ordered that final (partial) judgment be entered as to Counts II and III of Plaintiffs' Complaint, which the clerk did that same day. On November 30, 1983, Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals the dismissal of both "halves" of their Complaint.

On September 27, 1984, a panel of three Judges of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit entered an Order reversing the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 743 F.2d 1325. Petitioners filed a Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc. On November 27, 1984, that Petition was denied. It is the September 27, 1984, Order which we would ask this Court to review and reverse.

DESCRIPTION OF PLAINTIFFS' COMPLAINT

The Plaintiffs' Complaint was in four counts. The gravamen of Count I is that LPI, Jensen and Tomacruz, after termination

of LPI's distributorship by Gates Learjet Corporation:[6]

> "[I]n violation of *their* contractual covenants . . .(7) wrongfully continue to represent themselves as distributors or agents for the plaintiffs and to use the plaintiffs [sic] exclusive trade names and trademarks for their own benefit and for the purpose of confusing potential Gates Learjet customers to the detriment of the plaintiffs." Complaint, ¶13 (emphasis added).

Count I goes on to allege that Hamix International, Ltd., and James B. Jensen and Company, Inc., are "mere conduits through which the other defendants conduct their

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6 In its Counterclaim and in the Philippine action, Learjet Philippines, Inc., contends that the termination was wrongful and done in bad faith.

7 Even though the contract, which was attached to the Complaint, plainly shows that LPI and GLEC were the only contracting parties, Respondents allege that Jensen and Tomacruz also had "contractual covenants". Officer/shareholders of a corporation are not liable for contractual or other liabilities of the corporation. *Employer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Lunt*, 82 Ariz. 320, 313 P.2d 393 (1957).

business and hide their assets . . ." *Id.*, ¶14.[8]

The essential allegations of Count II of Plaintiffs' Complaint are that:

> "[T]he defendants 'Learphil', 'Jensen', and 'Tomacruz' have filed two civil actions and one criminal complaint in various courts in the Republic of the Philippines against the plaintiffs and have repeatedly caused property of the plaintiffs to be seized while in the Philippines, and have caused the arrest of an employee of the plaintiff." *Id.*, ¶15.

Count II goes on to allege that those actions "constitute an abuse of process".

Count III alleges that "[t]he defendants Jensen and Tomacruz have threatened and intimidated potential customers of the plaintiffs by threatening to join those customers in the vexatious litigation men-

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[8] That is what will be referred to hereafter as the *alter ego* claim. Respondents have never come forward with any evidence to support that claim. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed May 20, 1983.

tioned above."[9] Those actions were allegedly done "for the purpose of damaging or destroying the capability of the plaintiffs to conduct lawful business *within the Philippines*." Complaint, ¶16 (emphasis added).

Count IV is merely a restatement of Count I, only alleging a conspiracy among

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[9] The Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that:

> "Count three alleges that the defendants interfered with Gates' contractual relations with its customers in the Philippines. This count also arises out of the distributorship agreement because its factual basis concerns whether Jensen improperly used Gates' tradenames [sic] contrary to the terms of the distributorship agreement." 743 F.2d 1325, 1332.

That conclusion seriously misapprehends the relationship between the actual allegations of Count III and the distributorship agreement.

all the Defendants to make unlawful use of the trade name and mark.[10]

ARGUMENT

Introduction -- Significance of This Case --

Petitioners seek review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, first and most obviously, because it is wrong. The decision is also contrary to the decisions of this Court and of other Circuit Courts of Appeal and State Supreme Courts which have dealt with these issues. The jurisdictional issues are important, not only to the parties in this case, but to other litigants as well, because this case squarely presents the issues left unre-

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10 There is no such thing as a civil conspiracy under Arizona law. *Perry v. Apache Junction Elementary School District*, 20 Ariz. App. 561, 563-64, 514 P.2d 514, 516-17 (1973) (which is applicable to this case under *Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins*, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).

solved by *Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, supra.*

JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON

The opinion of the Court of Appeals does not, in any meaningful way, deal with the claims of any of the Petitioners other than LPI that they are not subject to the jurisdiction of the Arizona court. The court focused only on the fact that Learjet Philippines, Inc. (by and through Petitioners Jensen and Tomacruz), had entered into certain contracts with GLC and GLEC. Yet, it reversed the dismissal of Counts II and III as to all Defendants.

Petitioners' Contacts with Arizona --

The Court of Appeals correctly held that none of the Defendants is doing business in the State of Arizona and, therefore, they are not "present" here for the purpose of general jurisdiction over their persons. The evidence concerning Petitioners' contacts with Arizona is as follows:

(a) Hamix International, Ltd.: None. Hamix was the beneficiary of a contract between LPI, as trustee, and GLC/GLEC for the purchase of one airplane. When Hamix' Motion to Dismiss was denied, LPI counterclaimed for breach of that contract.

(b) James B. Jensen and Co., Inc. ("Jensen, Inc."): None. There was evidence that Jensen, Inc., had purchased, through the channels of interstate commerce, parts from GLC *in Wichita, Kansas* (Affidavit of James Jensen, Jr., attached to Motion to Dismiss of James B. Jensen & Co., Inc.) Other than that, the only evidence adduced by Respondents concerned Jensen, Inc., relaying LPI's mail through Jensen, Inc.'s San Francisco offices.

(c) James Jensen, Jr. and Ricardo Tomacruz traveled to Tucson, Arizona, from time to time, first to obtain for LPI (which was to be formed for that purpose) the Learjet distributorship for the

Philippines, then to enable LPI to carry out those duties. They attended distributors' conferences as officers of LPI and travelled to Tucson to pick up airplanes being purchased by LPI. Neither they nor LPI ever established a place of business in Arizona.

(d) Learjet Philippines, Inc., executed three annual distributorship agreements[11] (each of which contained an Arizona "Choice of Law" clause[12] and an

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11 Since all the agreements in this case were "form agreements", recent Arizona case law has cast doubt on the enforceability of terms such as those discussed here. *Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.*, 140 Ariz. 383, 682 P.2d 388 (1984).

12 "[T]his is an Arizona agreement and . . . it shall be governed by the laws of the State of Arizona of the United States of America in all matters, including, but not limited to, validity, obligation, interpretation, construction, performance and termination."

Arizona arbitration clause).[13] LPI also entered into several contracts for the purchase of aircraft, but no one contends

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[13] Not, as suggested by the Court of Appeals, an Arizona forum clause. It is most significant that not even LPI (much less Jensen and Tomacruz) ever agreed to be "hauled into court in Arizona" (where Gates, as it has so proudly hailed over and over again in this case, is one of the largest employers.) It is also very significant that Respondents did not take advantage of their Arizona arbitration clause. Had Respondents thought these claims arose out of their agreements with LPI, they presumably would have filed for arbitration under the provision of the contract that reads:

> "Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement, or the breach thereof, which has been timely and properly made, shall be settled by arbitration in Tucson, Arizona, in accordance with the Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Judgment upon the award rendered may be entered in *any court of any country having jurisdiction*." (Emphasis added.)

That provision certainly does not imply that LPI was agreeing that Arizona courts had jurisdiction over LPI.

that Respondents' Complaint in any way "arises out of" those contracts.

The essence of the holding of the Court of Appeals is as follows:

(1) Gates Learjet, sitting in Tucson, terminated[14] LPI's right to sell Learjets in the Philippines.

(2) The victim of the tort and breach of contract (LPI) filed suit in the Philippines, alleging: (a) its right to, and expectation of, making profits in the Philippines (based upon its efforts to sell aircraft in the Philippines) were wrongfully interfered with by Respondents, and (b) Gates Learjet sent its employee *to the Philippines* in an attempt to sell airplanes *in the Philippines* to customers LPI had "cultivated".

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[14] The termination was both a breach of contract and tort. *See Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co.*, 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127 (1982).

(3) The filing of the lawsuit in the Philippines by LPI subjects all the Petitioners to jurisdiction in Arizona, not to determine the validity of the contract or the termination thereof but, rather, to determine the legality of the lawsuit filed in the Philippines.

The Court of Appeals said:

> "Thus, count two of Gates' complaint arose out of the distributorship agreement *because its termination induced* defendants' alleged harassment and intimidation of Gates.' 743 F.2d 1325, 1332 (emphasis added).

Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), prohibits this "reactive" basis for jurisdiction.[15] *See also Rush v. Savchuk*, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).

It violates the very essence of *Hanson v. Denckla* to say that, because Gates'

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[15] "The unilateral activity of those who claim some relationship with a nonresident defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of contact with the forum State." 357 U.S. 235, 253.

principal residence and place of business is Tucson, Arizona, and its actions in Tucson angered and injured LPI *in the Philippines* and prompted LPI to bring suit *in the Philippines*, an Arizona court has jurisdiction to decide whether the lawsuit filed in the Philippines was an abuse of process (Count II) or a wrongful interference with "the capability of the plaintiffs to conduct lawful business within the Philippines" (Count III).

We can analogize to a slightly modified version of the classic example of long-arm jurisdiction:

A and B were married in state AA. B moved away to state BB and divorced A. Then A, standing on the border of State AA, shoots a gun across that border into State BB, striking B. B then brings an action in battery in the courts of State BB against A. A then sues B in the courts of State AA for "malicious prosecution".

In the example, it is true that, "but for" A's firing his gun (while in State AA), B would have never filed suit for battery.[16] Also, "but for" the marriage of A to B, A would not have committed the battery.[17] But the action involved is malicious prosecution (not battery and not divorce). While it is true that there is a relationship between the defendant, B, and the forum, AA, and it is also true that there is a relationship between the defendant and the litigation, there is not a sufficient "relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation", *Shaffer v. Heitner*, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977), to make the exercise of jurisdiction by the courts of AA over the person of

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16 That is activity within the forum analogous to Respondents' termination of LPI's distributorship.

17 That is contact with the forum analogous to LPI's "Arizona agreements" with Respondents.

B fair in the malicious prosecution action.[18]

Getting back to our case, it may be that, in the "For want of a nail the shoe was lost" sense, Counts II and III "arise out of" the distributorship agreement, but the question this Court should address is whether the relationship between Respondents' Complaint and Petitioners' forum-related activity is strong enough to satisfy the fairness requirements of *International Shoe, supra.*

The Case Law --

The recent history of this Court's involvement in the area of personal jurisdiction is rather interesting. Since *International Shoe Co. v. Washington,* 326 U.S. 310 (1945), first opened the door to

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[18] Even though it might be fair (and constitutional) for the courts of State AA to grant a divorce to A. *Williams v. North Carolina,* 325 U.S. 226 (1945).

"long-arm" jurisdiction back in 1945, the lower Federal courts and the state courts have engaged in a campaign of "creeping jurisdiction". In recent years, the Supreme Court has had to act to slow or reverse the trend of the lower courts to expand their power (jurisdiction) beyond the limits set forth in *International Shoe*.

Yet, even when this Court spoke on this subject, the lower courts did not always hear or understand what was being said. One of the strangest things was the

lack of attention the lower courts paid to *Hanson v. Denckla, supra.*[19]

After the decision in *Hanson v. Denckla,* this Court was silent on the

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19 One commentator described the history of *Hanson* and its progeny as follows:

> "In *Hanson v. Denckla,* the United States Supreme Court held that in every case in which personal jurisdiction was asserted over a nonresident defendant the plaintiff was required to show that the defendant had 'purposefully availed' itself of the protections and benefits accorded by the laws of the forum state. If one took that standard literally it was clear that there would be a great many cases in which jurisdiction could not be asserted over a nonresident defendant notwithstanding the fact that the assertion of jurisdiction was eminently fair. As a result, many commentators and many courts concluded that *Hanson* was simply a spoof on the part of the Supreme Court. The Arizona Supreme Court in *Phillips v. Anchor Hocking Glass Corp.* specifically held that the *Hanson* requirement did not apply to products liability litigation since in such cases the actor by definition does not act intentionally. As a result the *Hanson* standard fell into disuse until it was dramatically

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subject of personal jurisdiction for almost twenty years. Then, with *Shaffer v.*

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> resurrected in a series of four cases beginning in the 1976 term of the Supreme Court. The first of those cases, *Shaffer v. Heitner*, rejected Delaware's attempt to assert *quasi in rem* jurisdiction based upon the 'presence' of stock in a Delaware Corporation. The court there held that *all* assertions of state court jurisdiction had to be based upon a finding that the assertion of jurisdiction was consistent with the 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' standard first articulated in *International Shoe*. At the same time, the court signalled a resurrection of a relaxed *Hanson* requirement by noting that the defendant in the case before them could not have 'reasonably anticipated' being hailed before a Delaware court. In the next term, the Court once again emphasized the redefined *Hanson* standard in *Kulko v. Superior Court*, where it rejected jurisdiction in a case where it found that the defendant could not have 'reasonably anticipated' litigation in the forum state. Finally, last term in *World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodsen* [sic], the court made clear that

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Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), this Court finally began to reestablish the limits of *International Shoe*, *supra*, and *Hanson v. Denckla*, *supra*. The next year, the Court spoke on the subject again in *Kulko v. Superior Court*, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). Two years later, in *World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson*, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), and *Rush v. Savchuk*, 444 U.S. 320 (1980), then again

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> the *Hanson* test, as redefined in *Shaffer* and *Kulko*, is an essential element in every case in which jurisdiction is asserted over a nonresident defendant. In doing so, the court once again invoked the 'reasonable anticipation of litigation' language thus making crystal clear that the shift in focus begun in *Shaffer* had emerged as the new standard by which *Hanson*-type problems are to be judged." "Aftermath of *World-Wide Volkswagen*", Summary of Remarks of Professor Winton Woods, at the Arizona Judicial Conference, December 4, 1980, published as *Debugging Volkswagen: The New "Anticipation of Litigation" Test*, University of Arizona Law Record (Winter, 1980), p. 3.

last year in *Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, supra,* the Supreme Court stepped in to reverse the tide of widening jurisdiction in the lower courts.

The Unanswered Question --

This case squarely presents the issue scrupulously reserved by the Supreme Court in *Helicopteros Nacionales, supra.*[20] *Helicopteros Nacionales* involved the question of whether the defendant's contacts with the State of Texas were significant and continuous enough to warrant the exercise of *general* jurisdiction over the per-

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[20] The court's opinion in *Helicopteros Nacionales* was announced just two weeks prior to argument in this case and after all the briefs had been filed in the Court of Appeals. It was raised by Petitioners during oral argument on May 13, 1984, and in the Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc (Appendix 14, at p. 6).

son of the defendant.[21] Both the majority and dissent went to great pains to point out that the issue being decided was only whether defendant's business contacts with Texas were "continuous and systematic general business contacts . . ." 104 S. Ct. at 1873; *see also* 104 S. Ct. 1876, n. 1 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court did not reach the issue of "specific jurisdiction":

> "Because the parties have not argued any relationship between

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[21] The defendant's contacts were remarkably similar to those of LPI.

> "It is undisputed that Helicol does not have a place of business in Texas and never has been licensed to do business in the State. Basically, Helicol's contacts with Texas consisted of sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation session; . . . purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services from Bell Helicopter for substantial sums; and sending personnel to Bell's facilities in Fort Worth for training." ___ U.S. ___, 104 S. Ct. at 1873.

> the cause of action and Helicol's contacts with the State of Texas, we . . . assert no 'view' with respect to that issue.
>
> * * *
>
> . . . Absent any briefing on the issue, we decline to reach the [question] . . . what sort of tie between a cause of action and a defendant's contacts with a forum is necessary to a determination that either connection exists." 104 S. Ct. at 1873, n. 10.

See also id., n. 12.

This Court should not willingly leave any uncertainty on this issue of personal jurisdiction. This case can answer the questions left unanswered by *Helicopteros Nacionales*.

Let us, then, examine the contacts of *each* Defendant and *each* cause of action with the State of Arizona to see if there is any basis for jurisdiction. First of all, the activities of Learjet Philippines, Inc., can in no way support the exercise of

jurisdiction over the other Defendants. *Rush v. Savchuk, supra.*[22] *Helicopteros Nacionales, supra* ("Such unilateral activity of *another party* or a third person is not an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an assertion of jurisdiction." 104 S. Ct. at 1873 (emphasis added)).

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22 "The Minnesota court also attempted to attribute State Farm's contacts to Rush by considering the 'defending parties' together and aggregating their forum contacts in determining whether it had jurisdiction. The result was the assertion of jurisdiction over Rush based solely on activities of State Farm. Such a result is plainly unconstitutional. Naturally, the parties' relationships with each other may be significant in evaluating their ties to the forum. The requirements of *International Shoe*, however, *must be met as to each defendant* over whom a state court exercises jurisdiction." 444 U.S. 320, 331-32 (emphasis added).

The touchstone of personal jurisdiction is fairness. *International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra.* That is determined, as was pointed out above, by the "relationship among the *defendant*, the *forum*, and the *litigation* . . ." *Shaffer v. Heitner, supra,* 433 U.S. at 204 (emphasis added). Even if the exercise of jurisdiction over Learjet Philippines, Inc., be fair (because it entered into contracts with GLC and GLEC which are tangentially related to this litigation), that does not in any way make it fair to "drag" the individual officer/employees of that corporation, who were acting on its behalf, to Arizona for a trial. *Powder Horn Nursery,*

Inc. v. Soil and Plant Laboratory. Inc., 20 Ariz. App. 517, 514 P.2d 270 (1973).[23] *See*

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23 "Under these circumstances, it is difficult to say that these individual defendants, as opposed to their corporate employer, have caused an event to occur in Arizona with sufficient minimum contacts by these defendants with Arizona to justify the state's 'long arm' jurisdiction over them. The contractual objectives, which we deemed to be of considerable importance in establishing jurisdiction over the defendant corporate employer, are diluted significantly when considered in relation to the individual defendants. . . . While acts done by non-resident individuals in the scope of their employment or duties for a foreign corporation may be sufficient to establish *in personam* jurisdiction over their corporate employer, it does not necessarily follow that these same acts will be sufficient to support *in personam* jurisdiction over the non-resident individuals. *Wilshire Oil Company v. Riffe*, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969); *Willner v. Thompson*, 285 F. Supp. 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); *Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., Inc.*, 250 F. Supp. 850 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); *cf. Magidow v. Coronado Cattle Co.*, 19 Ariz. App. 38, 504 P.2d 961 (1972)." 20 Ariz. App. 517, 524, 514 P.2d 270, 277.

also Basham v. Hendee, 614 P.2d 87 (Okla. App. 1980).

The other serious problem with Counts II and III which the Court of Appeals did not adequately address concerns the interference with Philippine sovereignty. This is not just a problem with the difficulty of applying foreign law or the interest the Republic of the Philippines has "in resolving disputes that involve its citizens". 743 F.2d 1325, 1333.

Paragraph 15 of Respondents' Complaint seeks damages for "the filing of the civil actions, the criminal complaint, the seizure of plaintiffs' property and the arrest of plaintiffs' employee . . ." Count II will truly involve a United States court sitting in judgment as to the legality of actions taken by the courts of a foreign land. This Court has previously held that our courts will not sit in judgment of the acts of foreign sovereigns. *Banco Nacional*

de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 438-39 (1964); *see also Kunstsammlungen Zu Weimar v. Elicofon*, 678 F.2d 1150 (2d Cir. 1982); *Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.*, 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981); *Maltina Corporation v. Cawy Bottling Company*, 462 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir. 1972); *Signal Properties, Inc. v. Farha*, 482 F.2d 1136 (5th Cir. 1973).

Although Count III does not come as close to implicating the act of state doctrine (on its face, Count III is limited to interference with GLC's attempts to do business in the Philippines), it does involve the legality of alleged threats of litigation in the Philippines. Imagine if the situation were reversed, and a Philippine court were sitting in judgment of this Court's Noerr-Pennington Doctrine in the context of actions taken in <u>this</u> country or of some other restraint affecting trade in this country! *See Laker*

Airways Limited v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

So, the interference with Philippine sovereignty is much more substantial than the Court of Appeals realized. These are not just private interests being litigated in Counts II and III.

Summary --

The decision of the Court of Appeals cannot be allowed to stand. *Helicopteros Nacionales* all but invited this case to come before this Court. This case gives the Court the opportunity to address the "arising out of" issue, while dealing with an important question of international comity and respect for the courts of an ally of this country. Petitioners pray that the Court grant their Petition as to Counts II and III at least, so this dangerous precedent (and this injustice to them) can be erased.

FORUM NON CONVENIENS

The portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the conditional dismissal by Judge Marquez of Counts I and IV was, in some ways, as prejudicial to our court system and the orderly administration of justice here as the reversal as to Counts II and III was to the courts of the Republic of the Philippines.

There is no question that, if the District Judge had viewed the factors governing conditional dismissals for *forum non conveniens* the way the Court of Appeals did, his decision might have been affirmed. The Court of Appeals' conclusions were not devoid of support in the record.

The problem with the decision is that the Court of Appeals was not hearing the Motion to Dismiss; it was hearing the *appeal* of the District Court's dismissal.

This problem is very similar to the problem some of the Courts of Appeal have

with the "clearly erroneous" standard of review of discrimination decisions. *See Pullman-Standard v. Swint*, 456 U.S. 273 (1982). In this case, though, the difficulty is not in voicing the standard for review; it comes in applying what amounts to a "hands-off" policy.

The Court of Appeals here did just what the Court of Appeals in *Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. 235 (1981), had done:

> "The *forum non conveniens* determination is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion; where the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference. [Citation omitted.] Here, the Court of Appeals expressly acknowledged that the standard of review was one of abuse of discretion. In examining the District Court's analysis of the public and private interests, however, the Court of Appeals seems to have lost sight of this rule, and substituted its own

> judgment for that of the District Court." 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
>
> "An abuse of discretion is established only where no reasonable man could agree with the district court; if reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the court's action, no abuse of discretion has been shown." *Smith v. Widman Trucking & Excavating*, 627 F.2d 792, 795-96 (7th Cir. 1980).

An examination of the Court of Appeals' analysis of the private and public interest factors present here shows that they were not looking for a *clear* miscalculation by the District Judge but, rather, they were making their own *de novo* determination.

The Private Interest Factors --

Respondents Are in Court Because They Tried To Do Business Abroad.

One of the problems with the Court of Appeal's analysis is that they essentially ignore the fact that LPI filed suit in the Philippines against Respondents *before*

Respondents filed their action in the Arizona court. It is all well and good to say, "The plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed . . .", 743 F.2d 1325, 1334-35, but is it fair to apply that test in a case in which a party, who is already a defendant in an action in the foreign country, "runs back home" and files a suit against the foreigners to undo the trouble he got into abroad?

Respondents were not really "at home" Plaintiffs. They attempted to do business in a foreign country without obtaining the proper licenses. They got caught. They then returned home and asked the "home forum" to say that what they did in the Philippines was all right and that, in fact, what the Philippinos did in the Philippines to seek redress was wrongful.

In the words of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in *J. F. Pritchard and Company v. Dow Chemical of Canada, Ltd.*,

462 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1972), Respondents "made [their] bed in [the Republic of the Philippines]; now [they] must lie in it if [they] wish to proceed." 462 F.2d 998, 1002.

> "The doctrine that a United States citizen does not have an absolute right to use United States courts usually is expressed in the context of the citizen doing business abroad, expecting still to use United States courts." *Thomson v. Palmieri*, 355 F.2d 64, 65 (2d Cir. 1966).

That describes Respondents' predicament precisely.

The Chosen Forum.

There is a definite parochial bias to the decision of the Court of Appeals. Although the doctrine of abatement does not apply, since the actions are pending in different jurisdictions, *Laker Airways Limited v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, supra*, there is something essentially unfair about giving "great weight" to the

"plaintiff's choice of forum" when that is the second forum choice made in a dispute. That factor played a great part in the District Court's decision and absolutely no part in the analysis done by the Court of Appeals.

Location and Convenience of the Witnesses.

The Court of Appeals' conclusions concerning the location of witnesses demonstrates the primary reason why it is the District Court, and not the Court of Appeals, which should evaluate the evidence and weigh the relative inconvenience when deciding whether to conditionally dismiss a case so that it can be tried in a more convenient forum. The Court of Appeals' analysis of the private factors was limited to mechanistic view of the evidence. For example, the Court of Appeals quarrels with the District Judge's conclusion that the "vast majority" of the witnesses reside in

the Philippines, pointing to the fact that only twenty-three of forty-four total witnesses (a bare majority) live there.

The District Judge was not limited to a "head count" when making his decision. From the various motions which he had heard, the District Judge had become very familiar with the evidence and issues in this case. He was able to go beyond the bare numbers of witnesses and determine whether more of the *important* witnesses were located in the United States or in the Philippines. Respondents' Answers to Interrogatories disclosed *no witnesses* who would testify as to trade name infringement. The only witnesses they listed who would testify on the trademark claim were

Petitioners Tomacruz and James Jensen, Jr.[24]

It is also apparent from the very nature of Counts I and IV (as well as Counts II and III) that the vast majority of witnesses,[25] if there be any, would have

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[24] "[W]itnesses Nos. 8, 9 and 11 will testify as to their role in the Philippines attachment and judicial proceeding, as well as the trademark infringement, breach of contract and abuse of contracts counts of this Complaint . . ." Witness number 8 was identified as Ricardo Tomacruz. Witness number 9 was identified as James B. Jensen, Jr. There was no one identified as witness number 11. It is also interesting to note that Plaintiffs' answers to various interrogatories asking the identity of all persons who have knowledge of the alleged interference by the Defendants with Plaintiffs' contractual relations disclosed only Rolando Moscardon, Respondents' new distributor in the Philippines. Answers to Interrogatories 8 through 13, filed May 23, 1983. See also Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories filed May 24, 1983.

[25] The only witness listed by Respondents, other than the so-called "corporate damage witnesses", who is not located in the Philippines is Michael Fahey, the person who was arrested for trying to do business in the Philippines without a license.

to be located in the Philippines. Those claims only involved actions which took place in the Philippines.

There is one final witness problem that will attend trying this case in Arizona: Most of Respondents' Arizona witnesses are employees of Respondents. Respondents can, therefore, ensure their attendance at trial either in Arizona or in the Republic of the Philippines. The Philippine witnesses are, for the most part, independent of either party. It is problematical as to whether those witnesses can be encouraged[26] to attend a trial in the United States. Ambassadors and Generals,[27] for example, are not likely to

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26 They cannot be compelled.

27 In their Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories filed April 25, 1983, Respondents list as witnesses, General Hanz Menzi and Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto. Petitioners would also like to call General Menzi to testify and have listed him as a potential witness.

be willing to drop their weighty matters of state to attend a trial in Tucson, Arizona. So, when the "*quality*" (rather than just the quantity) of the witnesses located in either jurisdiction is considered, the convenience and fairness weigh heavily in favor of a trial in the Philippines.

Another incorrect conclusion concerning a private interest factor concerns the Court of Appeals' failure to consider the effect of bringing Counts II and III back into the case when it viewed Counts I and IV. Even assuming, *arguendo*, that the District Court has jurisdiction over the persons of all the Defendants and that the reversal as to the dismissal of Counts II and III was proper, the aggregation of all four counts of Plaintiffs' Complaint, together with the counterclaims, makes it clear that the Philippines is the more appropriate forum for the entire case. For example, once Counts II and III are

"brought back in", it is no longer true that "the parties were ready for trial when [the District Court] dismissed the complaint for *forum non conveniens.*" 743 F.2d 1325, 1335.

Resolution of Counts I and IV will, at best, only resolve a small portion of the controversy between the parties. The District Court was well aware when it dismissed Counts I and IV that, in any event, Counts II and III would have to be tried in the Philippines, and the case was not, therefore, "ready for trial".

The Public Interest Factors --

Just as the location of the witnesses changes complexion when Counts II and III are "added back", so does the balance of which nation's laws are most seriously implicated tip in favor of the Philippines. *See Schertenleib v. Traum,* 589 F.2d 1156 (2d Cir. 1978) (affirming *forum non conveniens* dismissal of an abuse of process

and defamation action filed by a Swiss attorney against a New York attorney, based upon the latter's filing of criminal charges in Geneva and testimony at a preliminary hearing in Geneva); *Bolanos v. Gulf Oil Corporation*, 502 F. Supp. 689 (W.D. Pa. 1980) (affirming *forum non conveniens* dismissal of abuse of process/malicious prosecution action by a Guatemalan plaintiff arising out of his arrest, conviction and incarceration in Guatemala for extortion committed in Guatemala).

The Court of Appeals erroneously stated that Petitioners concede that Arizona law would be applicable to the breach of contract claims. 743 F.2d 1325, 1336, n. 6. What Defendants said in their brief was that the contract theory "would be governed by different rules [than Respondents' tort theory]" for resolving questions of conflicts of laws (Appellants' Brief at 12, n. 4). That is not a

concession that Arizona law will apply. *See* Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §145, Comment *f*. Furthermore, Petitioners (except LPI) did not even have a contract with Respondents. As was pointed out above, even under Arizona law, a corporate officer/shareholder is not a party to a contract executed in the corporate name. *Employer's Liability Assur. Corp. v. Lunt, supra.*

As far as the trademark and trade name claims are concerned (Counts I and IV), Arizona has no trademark or trade name law which purports to have extraterritorial

effect.[28] That is consistent with the general law on the subject. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §145, Comment *f*, provides:

> ". . . The principal location of the defendant's conduct is the contact that will usually be given the greatest weight in determining the state whose local law determines the rights and liabilities that arise from . . . misappropriation of trade values." *Id.* at 424.

The other public interest factors have already been discussed in the portion of this Petition dealing with jurisdiction.

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28 *E.g.*, A.R.S. §44-1443 provides:

> "A. Subject to the limitations set forth in this article, any person who adopts and uses a trademark *in this state* may file in the office of the secretary of state, on a form to be furnished by the secretary of state, an application for registration of that trademark . . ." (Emphasis added.)

There is no Arizona statute or case which purports to give extraterritorial effect to that registration.

The Court of Appeals looked only at the (arguably) equal interests of each jurisdiction in protecting its citizens from harm. The court failed to take into account the interest the Republic of the Philippines has in its legal process.

There was one other factor relied on by Respondents, but not given much apparent weight by either the District Court or the Court of Appeals: the current political situation in the Philippines. Petitioners will only say two things on that subject: (1) there has been no showing that the current political unrest is affecting the courts in the Philippines; indeed, one might compare the problems there with the assassination of our President twenty-one years ago -- our courts continued to function then, just as theirs are now; and (2) if it turns out that civil order breaks down in the Philippines, Respondents can, under the express provisions of the

District Judge's Order, ask him to reverse the dismissal.

CONCLUSION

This Court, in *Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, supra,* has already announced the principles which the Court of Appeals should have followed when viewing the *forum non conveniens* issue. This Court should summarily reverse that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals and affirm the decision of the trial court dismissing Counts I and IV.

As to Counts II and III, the situation is a little different. *Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, supra,* expressly reserved the question of "specific jurisdiction" over the persons of defendants with contacts with the forum state like the contacts of Petitioners here. Granting this Petition and writing an opinion would do a great deal to clarify for the lower courts the rules to be

applied in situations where there is some tangential relationship between the defendants and the forum state, but none which is, in essence, an element of the cause of action being brought.

Petitioners pray that this Court grant their Petition for Writ of Certiorari and reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals.

Respectfully submitted this 24 day of April, 1985.

MOLLOY, JONES, DONAHUE, TRACHTA, CHILDERS & MAILLAMO, P.C.

By _____
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Attorneys for Petitioners

STATE OF ARIZONA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF MARICOPA)

I, HERBERT MALLAMO, one of the attorneys for James B. Jensen, Jr., Ricardo S. Tomacruz, Learjet Philippines, Inc., James B. Jensen & Co., Inc., and Hamix International, Ltd., Petitioners herein, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that, on the 2nd day of April, 1985, I deposited in a United States Post Office located at 1441 East Buckeye Highway, Phoenix, Arizona, with first-class postage prepaid, and properly addressed to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, within the time allowed for filing, the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari, and that I served copies of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the several parties thereto, as follows:

Michael J. Rusing
William H. Tinney
Post Office Box 871
Tucson, Arizona 85702

HERBERT MALLAMO

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of April, 1985, by HERBERT MALLAMO.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires:

May 22, 1986

84-1590

Office - Supreme Court, U.S.
FILED
MAR 4 1985
ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
CLERK

No. _____

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES

October Term, 1984

JAMES B. JENSEN, JR.; RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation and HAMIX INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a corporation,

Petitioners,

v.

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION,

Respondents.

On Appeal from the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals

Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari

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100pp

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INDEX TO APPENDIX
TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

NO.	FILING DATE	DESCRIPTION
1	9/23/82	Order
2	5/31/83	Order
3	11/1/83	Memorandum of Decision and Order
4	9/27/84	Opinion
5	11/27/84	Order

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION,	NO. CIV 82-139 TUC ACM
Plaintiffs,	ORDER
vs.	
JAMES B. JENSEN, JR., RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation, and HAMIX INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a corporation,	
Defendants.	

Plaintiffs Gates Learjet Corporation, and Gates Learjet Export Corporation have moved to amend the court's order of August 20, 1982. A review of the record reveals that prior to August 20th, James B. Jensen & Co., Inc. had been properly served, and therefore the court hereby amends its order insofar as it had quashed service on that defendant.

APPENDIX 1

Plaintiffs have since submitted proof of service upon defendant James Jensen, Jr. in the Republic of Philippines. The court is satisfied, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(i) (2) dealing with service in a foreign country, that service has been properly made on James Jensen, Jr.

Plaintiff's have also requested a ruling on defendant James B. Jensen & Co., Inc.'s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court has reviewed the information submitted in the pleadings, including the affidavits and discovery materials, and finds that there is sufficient basis for ruling on defendant James B. Jensen & Co., Inc.'s motion.

The plaintiffs, Gates Learjet Corporation, and Gates Learjet Export Corporation, are Delaware corporations authorized to transact business within the State of Arizona. Plaintiffs, herein

after called "GLC", have extensive manufacturing and marketing facilities located in Tucson, Arizona, where GLC also conducts annual distributorship conferences.

Defendant James B. Jensen & Co., Inc., hereinafter called "Jensen, Inc.", is a California corporation, with its principal place of business in a state other than Arizona, more specifically in San Francisco, California. The president of Jensen, Inc. is Mr. James Jensen, Jr., who on several occasions has traveled to GLC facilities in Tucson, Arizona.

On or about the last week in February 1978, Mr. Jensen traveled to Tucson, Arizona and discussed with GLC the possibility of becoming the GLC distributor for the Philippine area. Mr. Jensen states that none of his discussions with GLC concerned Jensen, Inc., and that a new

corporation would be formed in the event a distributorship was granted. Mr. Jensen also states that all negotiations relative to the distributorship were done by telephone, correspondence and telex from San FRancisco, and from Manila.

GLC maintains that on these occasions Mr. Jensen was acting in a multiple capacity, and a review of letters written by Mr. Jensen indicates such was the case. In a letter dated March 1, 1978, Mr. Jensen states ". . . my desire to actively sell Gates Learjets in the Philippines." In this letter, Mr. Jensen repeatedly uses the term "we" in discussing his capability to successfully market aircraft. This letter is written on Jensen, Inc. letterhead, and is signed in his capacity as president of Jensen, Inc. Nowhere in this letter is there mention of a new corporation; instead, Mr. Jensen

writes of another existing company, Aviation Specialist, Inc., which he personally owns, and which sells aircraft and aircraft parts.

Finally, in this letter, Mr. Jensen states that "they" are most anxious to get underway, needing only word from GLC, to start actively selling Gates Learjets in the Philippine area.

A letter dated March 20, 1978, written by Mr. Jensen in his capacity as president of Jensen, Inc. and on company letterhead, provides further evidence of Jensen, Inc.'s role. Mr. Jensen intermingles the terms "I" and "we" when referring to their marketing capability and selling activity. Again, there is no indication of a new corporation, whether in existence, or to be formed later.

There are additional letters, dated May 4, May 19, May 22, and May 25, 1978,

all dealing with the marketing operations in the Philippines, and written on Jensen, Inc. letterhead. Again Mr. Jensen uses the term "we" when discussion promoting and selling of GLC products.

The parties entered into a distributorship agreement, with the name of Learjet Philippines, Inc. shown as the distributor, on January 1, 1980. Learjet Philippines, Inc. is another defendant in this case and is a Philippine corporation, formed sometime in 1978. The president of Learjet Philippines is Mr. Jensen, and Jensen, Inc. holds a fifteen percent interest. A review of several letters from Mr. Jensen, signed in his capacity as president of Learjet Philippines, and on Learjet Philippines letterhead, reveals the degree of interrelationship between Jensen, Inc. and the new corporation.

In a October 12, 1978 letter, Mr. Jensen writes to GLC, Wichita, Kansas, requesting a discount for both Jensen, Inc. and Learjet Philippines and in which he refers to Jensen, Inc. as "Our San Francisco office".

He further asks, "I wish to request that your firm grant Learjet Philippines, Inc. and our U.S. affiliate company James B. Jensen & Co., Inc. the customary discounts you normally extend to your international distributors." One can reasonably conclude that Mr. Jensen himself considers Jensen, Inc. an active distributor of GLC products, working in concert with the names distributor, Learjet Philippines. This association is made clearer in another letter dated September 28, 1981, to GLC personnel in Tucson on Learjet Philippines letterhead, signed by Mr. Jensen as president.

He writes:

> In the filed of spares support Learjet Philippines as well as its U.S. purchasing arm, James B. Jensen & Co., Inc., purchased directly from Gates Learjet Corporation spares in the amount of U.S. dollars $75,544.68 in 1980 and $131,141.61 to date in 1981, all for its account in support of the Philippine fleet.

The fact that one sum is used for the purchasing activity of two companies, and all for the support of the Philippines fleet, which is the area of distributor responsibility under the agreement, buttresses the conclusion that Jensen, Inc. is an active member in the marketing activity which is the subject matter of the distributorship agreement.

The original distributorship was for a period of one year, and subsequently was extended for two years, and finally for an

additional period of four months. This agreement expired on April 30, 1981, and has not been extended or renewed by GLC. Plaintiffs' complaint, which was removed to this court on March 15, 1982, is based on four counts. Count one alleges continued use of GLC trade name and trademark in violation of the distributorship agreement termination; count two alleges abuse of process in the Philippines. Count three alleges interference with contractual and business relations, and count four alleges the defendants conspired to make unauthorized use of GLC trademark and name. For the purposes of determining personal jurisdiction over Jensen, Inc., counts one and four will be treated as asserting the same claim, i.e. unauthorized use of GLC trade name and trademark in violation of the agreement.

A federal court, in a diversity case such as the one at bar, has jurisdiction only if a court of the state in which the federal court is sitting would have jurisdiction. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e) and 4(d)(7). See 2 Moore's Federal Practice ¶4.41-1[1] and 4.32 [2] (2d ed. 1981). Jurisdiction over Jensen, Inc. must therefore be based upon Arizona's long-arm statute under Arizona Rule 4(e)(2). Traditionally, a two-tier analysis was used to determine whether a court had personal jurisdiction when using a state's long-arm statute. The first step was to determine if the defendant had qualified under the wording of the statute. If this requirement was met, the second step was to determine if exercise of jurisdiction satisfied constitutional due process standards. However, recent cases have held that where the state's long-arm

statute has been construed by the state court to establish jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by due process, the federal court need only consider whether asserting jurisdiction would violate due process. Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1269 (9th Cir. 1981). This approach is available to this court as the Supreme Court of Arizona has stated that Rule 4(e)(2) is intended to permit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-residents to the full extent of the law. Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112 Ariz. 307, 542 P.2d 24 (1975).

In assessing whether exercise of personal jurisdiction over Jensen, Inc. would violate due process, we must look to the standards established by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Hanson

v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); and World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The Ninth Circuit, with these cases in mind, first looks to the quantity and quality of defendants' activities. It the defendants' activities within the state are substantial, or continuous and systematic, the minimum contacts standard is satisfied to establish general jurisdiction, and therefore the cause of action need not arise from the defendants' forum-related activities. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Assoc's., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (1977); Swensen v. Murchison, 507 F.Supp.-509, 511 (N.D.Cal. 1981). Jensen, Inc. does not transact business within Arizona on a continuous or systematic basis, and does not provide the kind of contacts that would sustain exercise of general jurisdiction.

In Data Disc., supra, the Ninth Circuit further refined personal jurisdiction analysis and held that where general jurisdiction does not lie, the court must examine each cause of action or claim separately and determine whether it has jurisdiction on that claim. Id. at 1287, 1288. The Ninth Circuit developed a three part analysis to apply where the nonresident defendant's activities with the state do not permit general jurisdiction. Id. at 1287.

1. The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposefully avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum.
2. The claim must be one which arises out or results from the

defendant's forum-related activities.

3. The exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable. Id.

COUNT ONE AND COUNT FOUR

As stated earlier, the basis of these claims is the unauthorized use of GLC trade name and trademark, in violation of the termination of the distributorship agreement. These claims flow directly from the distributorship agreement. The distributorship agreement was entered into only after a lengthy and thorough negotiation process, during which Jensen, Inc., through its president, participated fully. Defendant's forum related activities satisfy part one of the Data Disc test. Part two is also satisfied by the fact that, as stated above, counts one and four arise out of the termination of the agreement, an agreement which is the

direct result of defendant's forum related activity. Part three of Data Disc is likewise satisfied. Jensen, Inc. aggressively solicited the distributorship contract, conducting a well-planned and persuasive promotional campaign to secure the distributorship from GLC. Defendant, therefore, "purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting" its working relationship with GLC within Arizona, not only in person, but through the mail, telephone and wire service. Swensen v. Murchison, supra, at 513. As to count one and four, the court has jurisdiction over defendant Jensen, Inc.

COUNT TWO AND COUNT THREE

These claims sound in tort law, and need to be examined with regard to both the conduct that gave rise to the claim, and the injury that resulted therefrom. See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology

Assoc.'s, Inc., supra, at 1288. Defendant's conduct, with respect to count two, cannot be said to have taken place in Arizona. Plaintiff alleges that defendant caused the property of plaintiff in the Philippines to be seized, and cause the arrest, in the Philippines, of one of plaintiff's employees. Count two also alleges that defendant has filed two civil actions in the Phillippines, all for the purposes of harassing, intimidating and threatening the plaintiffs. Not only has all the conduct giving rise to this claim occurred in the Philippines, but the injury if any has occurred there. Both part one and two of Data Disc, where the "claim must arise out of or result from the defendant's forum related activities," are not satisfied. Even if plaintiff could argue that some injury has occurred in Arizona as result of defendant's

conduct without the state, due process would not be satisfied. Cf. Northern Propane Gas Co. v. Kipps, 127 Ariz. 522, 622 P.2d 469 (1980) (negligence action, where one of injured parties was resident of Arizona).

In count three plaintiffs allege defendant deliberately interfered with the contractual and business relations of the plaintiffs and their potential customers by threatening and intimidating potential customers of the plaintiffs. This claim similarly fails to satisfy the requirements of Data Disc. No tortious activity can be considered to have occurred within the forum if the conduct and harm occurred outside the state. See Lehigh Valley Industries v. Birenbaum, 527 F.2d 87, 94 (2d Cir. 1975). In the case at bar, if there was a loss of customers, it was

clearly customers in the area of the Philippines, and not in the forum state.

The principal contact relied upon by GLC is the activities defendant engaged in while procuring the distributorship. We have already discussed how such a relationship as existed between Jensen, Inc. and the other defendants gave rise to jurisdiction over claims directly related to the agreement, such as disputes over termination thereof as in counts one and four. But the claims of counts two and three, sounding in tort law, cannot be said to arise out of the distributorship agreement. These claims result from the conduct of defendant outside the state, and are too attenuated a contact to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction. Therefore,

IT IS ORDERED that defendant Jensen, Inc.'s motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction is denied as to counts one and four and granted as to counts two and three.

DATED this 23 day of September, 1982.

ALFREDO C. MARQUEZ
United States District
Judge

Copies mailed this date to:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

Civil Case No. CIV-82-139-TUC-ACM

Date May 31, 1983

Title: GATES LEARJET CORP. vs. JAMES B. JENSEN, et al.

Present: HON. ALFREDO C. MARQUEZ JUDGE

Renee Ludeke
Deputy Clerk

Gus Rico
Court Reporter

ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFF(s)
William H. Tinney
Michael Rusing

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANT(s)
Gary F. Howard

Proceedings: X Open Court

PLTFS' MOTION TO COMPEL AND FOR SANCTIONS; DEFTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

Hearing had. IT IS ORDERED that all new discovery is stayed until further order of the Court. Counsel are directed to file a written request for any further

discovery setting forth purpose of discovery; witnesses to be deposed, etc.

Court's order of September 23, 1982 is clarified to reflect that Counts 2 and 3 are dismissed as to all parties named in those counts.

IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk is to accept for filing the depositions of James B. Jensen, Jr. and Ricardo S. Tomacruz in this case.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Compel Answers to the Interrogatories is granted; Motion to Compel re the San Francisco Depositions is taken under advisement.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that all further discovery motions to be filed in this case are to be heard in this court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for sanctions is granted. Defendants are ordered to pay the sum of $500.00 in

attorneys fees pursuant to Rule 37. Plaintiffs are directed to file an affidavit re time spent in support of the motions for sanctions. Defendants have five (5) days to respond to the affidavit. The order for sanctions will stand until receipt of affidavit and opposition at which time the court will make a final determination.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss is denied with leave to renew.

Counsel are further directed to notify each other by letter with a copy to the court of which paragraphs they have complied with in the stipulation entered into which was filed on May 9, 1983.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION, Plaintiffs, vs. JAMES B. JENSEN, JR.; RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation, and HAMIX INTERNATIONAL LTD., a corporation, Defendants.	No. CIV 82-139 TUC ACM
JAMES JENSEN, JR.; RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; and LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation, Counterclaimants, vs. GATES LEARJET CORPORATION; GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION; B.S. STILLWELL and JANE DOE STILLWELL, husband and wife; and STILLWELL AVIATION AUSTRALIA PTY., LTD., Counterdefendants.	MEMORANDUM OF DECISION AND ORDER

APPENDIX 3

Gates Learjet Corporation [GLC] is a manufacturer of jet aircraft. Gates Learjet Export Corporation (GLEC) is a corporation organized to handle international sales for Gates Learjet. Defendant James B. Jensen, Jr. is a resident of California and the Philippines. Defendant Tomacruz is a citizen and resident of the Philippines. Defendant Learjet Philippines, Inc. (Lear Phil) is a nonresident foreign corporation established pursuant to the laws of the Philippines with its principal offices in Manila. Defendant James B. Jensen & Company, Inc. (Jensen, Inc.) is a California corporation whose principal place of business is San Francisco, California. Defendant Hamix International Ltd. (Hamix) is a nonresident foreign corporation whose principal

place of business is Hong Kong, British Crown Colony.

The complaint [Count One] alleges that on January 1, 1980, Jensen and Tomacruz on their own behalf and on behalf of Lear Phil, Jensen, Inc. and Hamix entered into an international distributor's agreement, whereby Lear Phil would become the distributor of Learjet Aircraft in the Philippines for one year. Plaintiff alleges that the agreement expired on April 30, 1981, and was not thereafter renewed or extended, that in spite of the termination of the agreement the defendants Lear Phil, Jensen and Tomacruz wrongfully continued to represent themselves as distributors or agents for the plaintiffs and to use the plaintiffs' exclusive trade names and trademarks for their own benefit and for the purpose of confusing potentional Gates Learjet

customers to the detriment of the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that Hamix and Jensen, Inc. are corporations formed by the defendants Jensen, Tomacruz and Lear Phil and are mere conduits through which the other defendants conduct their business and hide their assets and any judgment awarded to plaintiffs should be awarded against these corporations.

Counts Two and Three allege that the defendants Lear Phil, Jensen and Tomacruz have filed two civil actions and one criminal complaint in the Republic of the Philippines against the plaintiffs; have repeatedly caused property of the plaintiffs to be seized in the Philippines; have caused the arrest of an employee of the plaintiff; that these actions were solely for the purpose of harassing, intimidating and threatening the plaintiffs and constitute an abuse of process;

that defendants Jensen and Tomacruz have threatened and intimidated potential customers of the plaintiffs by threatening to join those customers in the vexatious litigation and that the defendants Jensen and Tomacruz have thereby deliberately interfered with the contractual and business relations of the plaintiffs and their potential customers. Counts Two and Three were dismissed by the court because all of the acts alleged in those counts occurred in the Philippines.

Count Four alleges that the defendants Jensen, Tomacruz, Lear Phil, Jensen, Inc. and Hamix conspired to make unauthorized use of the trademark and the name of the plaintiffs, and that the use tends to confuse the public into believing that the defendant's business is in some way connected with the business of the plaintiffs.

The complaint prays for an order restraining the defendants from continuing the practice as set forth in the complaint, for damages and costs and attorney's fees.

The defendants, James Jensen, Jr., Tomacruz, and Lear Phil have filed counterclaim naming the plaintiffs and B.S. Stillwell and Jane Doe Stillwell, husband and wife, and Stillwell Aviation Australia, Ltd., as additional parties in the counterclaim. The counterclaim contains six counts. Counts One through Four allege a wrongful termination of the distributorship agreement, wrongful interference with the customers of the counterclaimants, unjust enrichment, etc. All of these acts alleged in the counterclaim apparently occurred in the Philippines. Count Five involves a contract between Hamix and GLC and GLEC for a Gates

Learjet Aircraft. It alleges a breach of contract by GLC and GLEC. Count Six alleges that the counterdefendants, acting through various agents and employees, have informed customers of Lear Phil that Lear Phil, Jensen and Tomacruz were not honorable, honest and qualified to market Learjet aircraft. It alleges that this was done maliciously and prays for compensatory and punitive damages for the libel and slander. These acts also appeared to have occurred in the Philippines.

The defendants have asked that the court dismiss the plaintiff's complaint and all of the counterclaimant's claims against the counterdefendants, with the exception of Count Five of the counterclaim. The motion to dismiss is based on forum non conveniens.

The defendants, in their motion, asked that the action be dismissed on the following conditions:

1. That the courts of the Republic of the Philippines have and/or will assert jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims alleged in the actions being dismissed;

2. That the defendants consent to submit themselves to the personal jurisdiction of the appropriate courts of the Republic of the Philippines;

3. That the defendants make their employees available as witnesses to testify in the Republic of the Philippines;

4. That the defendants waive any statute of limitations defenses which might have arisen during the pendency of the actions in this court;

5. That the defendants recognize any

judgment rendered by the appropriate court of the Republic of the Philippines.

6. That depositions and documents produced so far in this action and answers to interrogatories may be used in the Philippines action, subject to objections which could be made to those products of discovery in this court. Defendants ask that the court retain jurisdiction of Count Five, (the contract for sale of a jet aircraft between Hamix and GLC and GLEC). This count is entirely unrelated to the other counts of the complaint and the counterclaim.

At the outset of any forum non conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists an alternative forum. Ordinarily, this requirement must be satisfied when the defendant is "amenable to process" in the other jurisdiction. Gulf Oil Corporation

v. Gilbert, 67 S.Ct. 839 (1947). Plaintiffs, in their opposition to the motion, do not question that there is an alternative forum. The defendants are willing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the appropriate court of the Philippines and recognize any judgment rendered by such a court. They further consent to make their employees available as witnesses to testify in any action in a Philippines court.

Plaintiffs refer to the presently existing unstable situation in the Philippines and contend that a court should not send American plaintiffs to litigate disputes in a forum where there is a serious question as to the type of justice they would receive. They also allege that there are grave doubts as to the safety of American witnesses, attorneys, etc.

Any dismissal by this court would be a conditional dismissal. If the plaintiffs, later on in the litigation, feel that because of the political unrest in the Philippines they are being deprived of a fair trial they can ask this court to set aside the conditional dismissal and take jurisdiction of the claims.

The Supreme Court has set out a balancing test to be used by district courts in deciding whether or not an action should be dismissed on the ground of forum non conveniens, Gilbert, supra; Koster v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 67 S.Ct 828 (1947). In those decisions, the Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed. However, when an alternative forum has jurisdiction to hear the case, and when trial in the chosen forum would "establish . . . oppressiveness and

vexation to a defendant out of all proportion to the plaintiff's convenience," or when the "chosen forum (is) inappropriate because of considerations affecting the court's own administrative and legal problems," the court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, dismiss the case. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 102 S.Ct. 252 (1981). To guide the trial court's discretion, the Court provided a list of "private interest factors" affecting the convenience of the litigants, and a list of "public interest factors" affecting the convenience of the forum. The factors pertaining to the private interest of the litigants included the "relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, possibility of viewing the

premises, if view would be appropriate to the action, and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive.

The "public interest factors" included the administrative difficulties flowing from the court's congestion; the "local interest in having localized controversies decided at home"; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is at home with the problems and conflicts of law, or in the application of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty. Id. at 258, n.6.

As pointed out above, the plaintiffs allege that defendants Lear Phil, Tomacruz and Jensen filed two civil suits and one criminal suit in the Philippines. In Civil case No. 43874, Lear Phil is the

plaintiff, GLC and GLEC are the defendants.

The complaint was filed on December 1, 1981. The plaintiffs filed their action in the District of Arizona on February 3, 1982.

A review of the pleadings in Cause No. 43874 reveals that it involves the alleged wrongful termination of the distributorship, interference with customers, unjust enrichment of the prior efforts of Lear Phil in promoting GLC products in the Philippines, and damages to reputations.

These are the same allegations of the counterclaim filed in the Arizona action [except for the Hamix Court].

GLC and GLEC have filed an answer and counterclaims in the Philippine action. The counterclaim also concerns the termination of the distributorship.

The record reflects another action filed on January 18, 1981 in the Philippines in which Tomacruz and Jensen, Jr. are plaintiffs and B.S. Stillwell, John Benson, Michael Fahey, GLC and GLEC are defendants. This action also deals with the same subject matter as the counterclaims in the Arizona action.

A review of the record in the Arizona action and the pleadings in the pending Philippine actions makes it abundantly clear that the vast majority of the witnesses reside in the Philippines and almost all of the acts alleged in the complaints and counterclaims occurred in the Philippines.

The factors pertaining to the private interests of the litigants weigh heavily in favor of dismissing the action on the grounds of forum non-conveniens.

This is especially true when there is pending litigation in the foreign forum which was filed before the plaintiffs filed their complaint in Arizona.

The public interest factors also weigh heavily in favor of a dismissal.

Counsel have indicated that there are hundreds, if not thousands, of exhibits involved. There will be many witnesses testifying for both sides. The case will take weeks to try.

The Tucson division of the District of Arizona is presently operating with two district judges. Normally there are three judges in the division. The two judges are handling all the criminal calendar. Outside judges have been assigned to handle part of the civil calendar and it is contemplated that more help will be necessary in the future.

It would be unfair to burden citizens with extended jury duty when this district has such a minor connection with the controversies.

Because most of the operating facts occurred in the Philippines, that country has a substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation.

Aside from the political unrest, plaintiffs do not contend that Philippine law will be less favorable.

The controversies will require the application of Arizona law and Philippine law. There is no reason to believe that this court is better equipped to apply Philippine law than a Philippine court applying Arizona law.

The court finds that trial in this district would impose a heavy burden on the parties and the court.

After considering all of the factors relating to public and private interests, the court is convinced the motion to dismiss should be granted.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. That the plaintiffs' Complaint is dismissed on the following conditions.

(a) That the courts of the Philippines accept jurisdiction to adjudicate the plaintiffs' claims.

(b) That the defendants submit to the jurisdiction of the appropriate court in the Philippines.

(c) That the defendants make their employees available for process and as witnesses in the Philippines.

(d) That defendants waive any statute of limitations defenses which might have arisen during the pendency of the actions in this court.

(e) That defendants recognize any judgment rendered by a court in the Philippines.

(f) All discovery and the products may be used in any action in the Philippines - subject to objections which could be made in this court.

2. The defendants' counterclaims, except for the Hamix count, are dismissed.

The complaint and the counterclaims are all interrelated. Resolution of the plaintiffs' claims would, in effect, resolve the defendants' counterclaims. If, for some unforeseen reason the counterclaims cannot be resolved in the Philippine litigation, this court will entertain a motion by the defendants to reinstate the counterclaims that this court has jurisdiction to hear.

The court has pending two motions for attorneys' fees.

IT IS ORDERED:

1. The plaintiffs' Motion for Attorney's Fees re: Motion to Strike GLC/GLEC's Answer to Counterclaim is denied.

2. The previous order awarding plaintiffs' attorney's fees in the sum of $500 is re-affirmed.

In view of the court's ruling on the Motion to Dismiss for forum non conveniens, there is no need for the court to rule on any other pending motions.

Dated this 1st day of November, 1983.

_____

ALFREDO C. MARQUEZ
United States District Judge

Copies mailed this date to:

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION,	)	
Plaintiffs-Appellants,	)	No. 83-2643
vs.	)	OPINION
JAMES B. JENSEN, JR.; RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation, and HAMIX INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a corporation,	)	
Defendants-Appellees.	)	

William H. Tinney, Michael J. Rusing, Bilby, Shoenhair, Warnock & Dolph, Tucson, Ariz., for plaintiffs-appellants.

D. Michael Mandig, John F. Molloy, Molloy, Jones, Donahue, Trachta, Childers & Mallamo, P.C., Tucson, Ariz., for defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona.

Before CHOY, PREGERSON and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

CHOY, Circuit Judge:

The issues on this appeal are (1) whether the district court properly dismissed counts two and three of appellant's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, and (2) whether the district court's dismissal of counts one and four for forum non conveniens was an abuse of discretion. On both issues, we reverse and remand to the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Gates Learjet Corporation and Gates Learjet Export Corporation ("Gates") entered into an international distributorship agreement with Learjet Philippines, Inc. ("LPI") in 1978. Gates, principally located in Tucson, Arizona, manufactures executive aircraft known as Learjets. LPI is a Philippine corporation. The original agreement was for a period of one year but was renewed for an

additional two years and four months.

James B. Jensen, Jr., a United States citizen with residence in California and the Philippines, is the president of LPI and James B. Jensen & Co. ("Jensen, Inc."), a California corporation located in San Francisco. The negotiations for the international distributorship agreement occurred both in Tucson, when Jensen visited Gates, and by telephone, correspondence, and telex from Tucson to Manila and San Francisco. The agreement provides that it "is an Arizona agreement and that it shall be governed by the laws of the State of Arizona of the United States of America in all matters, included but not limited to, validity, obligation, interpretation, construction, performance and termination."

During the time the agreement was in effect, Jensen and Ricardo S. Tomacruz,

the vice-president and general manager of LPI and a citizen and resident of the Philippines, made several trips to Tucson on behalf of LPI. The purposes of Jensen's visits, which numbered at least seven between February 1978 and September 1981, included arrangement of an aircraft sale, meetings with Gates' employees, and attendance at Gates' international distributor conference and the delivery of several airplanes. LPI also entered into several airplane purchase agreements with Gates in Tucson. Each agreement contained a choice of law provision specifying Arizona and a choice of forum provision that the "courts of Arizona shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims, disputes, actions, or suits which may arise hereunder." In addition, LPI and Jensen, Inc. purchased over $200,000 in spare parts from Gates.

In 1981, Gates did not renew the international distributorship agreement with LPI. On February 3, 1982, Gates filed a four-count complaint in an Arizona state court against Jensen, Tomacruz, LPI, Jensen, Inc., and Hamix International Ltd., a Hong Kong corporation ("defendants"). Count one of the complaint alleges unauthorized use of Gates' tradenames and trademarks. Count two alleges abuse of process arising out of the seizure by Philippine authorities of a Gates' aircraft and the jailing of its pilot. Count three alleges interference with contractual relations between Gates and customers in the Philippines. Count four alleges a conspiracy to make unauthorized use of Gates' tradename and trademark. The action was removed to a federal district court for diversity of

citizenship.

On September 23, 1982, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed counts two and three for lack of personal jurisdiction as to one of the defendants, Jensen, Inc. Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, No. CIV 82-139 (D.Ariz. Sept. 23, 1982) (Gates Learjet I). After this partial dismissal, the defendants answered the complaint and filed a six-count counterclaim. The counterclaim alleges improper termination of the distributorship agreement, unjust enrichment, interference with contractual relations, and defamation. It added three parties to the litigation: B.S. Stillwell, Jane Doe Stillwell, and Stillwell Aviation Australia Party, Ltd. On May 31, 1983, the district court clarified its earlier dismissal order and dismissed counts two and three as to all of the

defendants.

On October 5, 1983, after 18 months of trial preparation, the defendants challenged the convenience of the forum. The defendants allege that two civil actions pending in Philippine courts make the same allegations as the action brought by Gates in Arizona. On November 1, 1983, the district court conditionally dismissed counts one and four of the complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. The court dismissed Gates' complaint on the following conditions: 1) The Philippine courts accept jurisdiction; 2) the defendants submit to that jurisdiction; 3) the defendants make their employees available for process and as witnesses; 4) the defendants waive any newly arisen statute of limitations defenses; 5) the defendants recognize any Philippine court judgment; and 6) all discovery and

products may be used in any action in the Philippines, subject to objections which could be made in this court. Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen, No. CIV 82-139, slip op. at 11 (D.Ariz. Nov. 1, 1983) (Gates Learjet II).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Personal Jurisdiction

(1) The district court dismissed counts two and three of Gates' complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. As the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court, Gates has the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir.1977).-1 Arizona's long-arm statute estab-

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1 Gates contends that the defendants waived any objection to personal jurisdiction when they invoked the jurisdiction of this court by asking for affirmative relief in a permissive counterclaim. The courts are divided on the issue of whether the assertion of a permissive counterclaim should constitute a waiver of a jurisdictional defense. Compare North Branch Products, Inc. v. Fisher, 284 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C.Cir.1960) (waiver) and Merz v. Hemmerle, 90 F.R.D. 566, 569 (E.D.N.Y.1981) (waiver) with Neifeld v. Steinberg, 438 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir.1971) (no waiver) and Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 566 F.Supp. 846, 851 (E.D.Ark.1983) (no waiver). See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.Fed. 390 (1973). Although this

court has held that the defendant's assertion of a compulsory counterclaim "does not constitute a waiver of any jurisdictional defense he previously or concurrently asserts," Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co., 378 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir.1967), we have not decided whether the assertion of a permissive counterclaim constitutes a waiver. As to defendant Jensen, Inc., this case is easily resolved because Jensen, Inc. brought a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction prior to the filing of the answer and counterclaim. See Neifeld v. Steinberg, 438 F.2d at 428 n. 10 (clearly no waiver when jurisdictional defenses raised by motion prior to filing of answer). The other defendants, however, did not raise the jurisdictional defense until they filed their answer and counter claim. Nevertheless, we hold that the filing of a permissive counterclaim does not constitute a waiver of a personal jurisdiction defense asserted in the same pleading. Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly authorizes a defendant to join a jurisdictional defense with a counterclaim without waiving this defense. The rule permits a defendant to raise jurisdictional defenses by motion or by answer. If we were to find a waiver when a defendant files a permissive counterclaim in the same pleading in which he asserts jurisdictional defenses, the purposes behind Rule 12(b)--to avoid the delay caused by successive motions and pleadings and to reverse the prior practice of asserting jurisdictional defenses by "special appearances"-- would

lishes personal jurisdiction over non-residents to the maximum extent permitted by due process. Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24, 26 (1975). Due process requires the defendants to have certain minimum contacts with the forum so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 158, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Brothers Garage, 735 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir.1984). To satisfy this due process requirement, Gates may prove "general jurisdiction" or "limited

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be thwarted. See Neifeld v. Steinberg, 438 F.2d at 429. Moreover, courts have noted that when the rule makers wanted to attach "waiver" consequences in certain situations, they did so explicitly. See id. at 428 & n. 11; Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co., 566 F.Supp. at 850.

jurisdiction."

1. General Jurisdiction

(2) A sufficient relationship between the defendants and Arizona exists to support general jurisdiction if Gates can demonstrate that the defendants' activities within Arizona are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic." See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d at 1287. We review the district court's holding that Jensen "does not transact business within Arizona on a continuous or systematic basis, and does not provide the kind of contacts that would sustain exercise of general jurisdiction." Gates Learjet I, slip op. at 7.

Gates cites five activities to prove that defendants' contacts with Arizona were "continuous and systematic" and "substantial": 1) Jensen solicited the

distributorship agreement in Arizona; 2) the defendants visited Tucson a number of times; 3) the airplane purchase agreements between Gates and Jensen contained an Arizona choice of law and forum provision; 4) the defendants purchased spare parts from Gates in Tucson; and 5) the defendants sent many letters and telexes and made numerous telephone calls to Tucson.

(3)(4) We must decide whether these contacts constitute sufficient activity in Arizona to conclude that the defendants "may in fact be said already to be 'present' there." Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406, 413 (9th Cir.1977). Moreover, we must focus upon the "economic reality" of the defendants' activities rather than a mechanical checklist. See Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional, 614

F.2d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir.1980) (quoting Foster v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 68 Cal.App.3d 887, 137 Cal.Rptr. 694, 697 (1977)).

(5)(6)(7)(8) We conclude that the "economic reality" here is that defendants' activities in Arizona were not "continuous and systematic" or "substantial". Jensen's solicitation of the distributorship agreement in Arizona and the defendants' visits to Tucson do not constitute "conducting business" in Arizona. See Rocke v. Canadian Automobile Sport Club, 660 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir.1981). Making telephone calls and sending telexes and letters to Tucson are not activities which support a finding of general jurisdiction. See Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional, 614 F.2d at 1254. Furthermore, the choice of forum provision in the airplane purchase

agreement applies only to disputes arising out of those agreements. Significantly, the defendants did not establish a regular place of business in Arizona. See Rocke v. Canadian Automobile Sport Club, 660 P.2d at 399. These contacts in their totality do not demonstrate sufficient activity in Arizona to support general jurisdiction. Defendants' activities in Arizona were more occasional than continuous, and more infrequent than systematic.

2. Limited Jurisdiction

(9) If a defendant's activities are not so pervasive to subject them to general jurisdiction, this court makes the following evaluation in determining whether there is limited jurisdiction:

(1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposely avails himself

of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.

(2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities.

(3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir.1977).

(10) Gates clearly satisfies the first prong of this test. Not only did Jensen solicit the distributorship agreement in Arizona, but also the agreement specifically provides that Arizona law governs it. The distributorship agreement, therefore, directly invokes the benefits and protections of Arizona laws. See O'Hare International Bank v. Hampton, 437 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir.1971);

Alchemie International, Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F.Supp. 1039, 1054 (D.N.J.1981). Given these circumstances, Jensen should have reasonably anticipated "being haled into court" in Arizona. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 567, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980).

Prong two of the Data Disc inquiry requires that each claim "arises out of or results from" the defendants' forum related activity. 557 F.2d at 1287. The district court had the most trouble with this part of the test, stating:

> The claims of counts two and three, sounding in tort law, cannot be said to arise out of the distributorship agreement. These claims result from the conduct of defendant outside the state, and are too attenuated a contact to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction.
>
> Gates Learjet I, slip op. at 10. After examining the record, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that the claims

> in counts two and three are "too attenuated a contact" to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

(11) Count two of Gates' complaint alleges that the defendants filed two civil actions and one criminal complaint in the Philippines which caused the seizure of one of Gates' Learjets and the arrest of one of its employees. Count two alleges further that these actions were meant to harass, intimidate and threaten Gates and constitute an abuse of process.

At first blush, this count may appear to be unrelated to the distributorship agreement. An examination of the complaint that the defendants filed in the Philippines on December 1, 1981, however, dispels any doubt that this count "arises out of" the distributorship agreement.

The first cause of action in the Philippines complaint alleges that Gates' nonrenewal of the distributorship agreement with the defendants was "clearly contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order." The second cause of action alleges "moral" and reputation damages for Gates' bad faith in refusing to renew the distributorship agreement. The third cause of action alleges wanton and fraudulent behavior in refusing to negotiate the renewal of the distributorship agreement. Thus, count two of Gates' complaint arose out of the distributorship agreement because its termination induced defendants' alleged harassment and intimidation of Gates. Count two was not too attenuated from the distributorship agreement to support a finding of limited jurisdiction.

(12) We similarly conclude that count

three of Gates' complaint satisfies the second prong of the Data Disc test. Count three alleges that the defendants interfered with Gates' contractual relations with its customers in the Philippines. This count also arises out of the distributorship agreement because its factual basis concerns whether Jensen improperly used Gates' tradenames contrary to the terms of the distributorship agreement.2

The third and final prong of the Data Disc inquiry requires a court's exercise

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2 Gates cites cases that interpret an Arizona attorney's fee statute and hold that tort claims arise out of a contract if they could not exist "but for" the contract. See, e.g., Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co., 132 Ariz. 529, 544, 647 P.2d 1127, 1141 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1070, 103 S.Ct. 490, 74 L.Ed.2d 632. Although these cases interpret the "arises out of" language in a manner that supports Gates' construction, Gates never demonstrates why this court, in applying a constitutional due process test, should adopt an Arizona court's interpretation of an irrelevant state statute.

of jurisdiction to be reasonable. 557 F.2d at 1287. This court has identified seven factors as pertinent to the reasonableness inquiry:

(A) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum state;

(B) the burden of defending in the forum state; (C) the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state;

(D) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute;

(E) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy;

(F) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and

(G) the existence of an alternative forum.

Rocke v. Canadian Automobile Sport

Club, 660 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir.1981); see Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir.1981). "These factors are not mandatory tests, each of which plaintiff must pass in order for a court properly to assume jurisdiction. Instead, the factors illuminate the considerations of fairness and due process set forth in International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310 (66 S.Ct. at 154)." Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd., Osaka, 715 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir.1983).

The application of these factors to this case convinces us that it would be reasonable to subject the defendants to the jurisdiction of the Arizona court. We consider each of the factors in turn.

(13) Although not extensive enough to support general jurisdiction, the contacts of LPI, Jensen, and Tomacruz with Arizona are sufficient to demonstrate a purposeful

interjection into the forum state. Jensen solicited an international distributorship agreement in Tucson, which contained a choice of law provision specifying Arizona. Both Jensen and Tomacruz made several visits to the Gates' facilities and even accepted delivery of airplanes in Tucson. Moreover, these airplane purchase agreements contained choice of law and forum provisions, both of which specified Arizona. Thus, the terms of important contracts between Gates and the defendants demonstrate that the defendants had notice that they might be brought into a court in Arizona.

(14) The burden on the defendants of defending in Arizona, as opposed to the Philippines, is potentially significant. Litigating abroad imposes significant inconveniences upon the party appearing in a foreign country. Olsen By Sheldon

v. Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 650 (9th-Cir.1984). We nevertheless conclude that the burden on the defendants would not be substantial here, primarily because the defendants must litigate in Arizona anyway. The district court found personal jurisdiction as to counts one and four. The extra burden of defending counts two and three in Arizona, particularly in light of their connection to counts one and four, would be minimal.

(15)(16) The reasonableness of jurisdiction depends also in part upon the seriousness of the potential affront to the sovereignty of the defendants' state. A foreign nation presents a higher sovereignty barrier than that between two states within our union. Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d at 1272. Two of the three defendants

named in counts two and three are residents of the Philippines. The government of the Philippines clearly has an interest in resolving disputes that involve its citizens. Nevertheless, we note that this factor is not dispositive because, if given controlling weight, it would always prevent suit against a foreign national in a United States court.

(17) We examine next Arizona's interest in adjudicating this dispute. Arizona has a strong interest in ensuring that its citizens are fully compensated for their injuries, in part to protect the state's economic resources from unnecessary expenditures. See Olsen By Sheldon v. Mexico, 729 F.2d at 651.

(18) At the current stage of the litigation, Arizona would appear to be the more efficient forum to resolve this dispute. Gates alleges, and defendants do

not dispute, that discovery is completed and "this matter could be tried in a matter of weeks." In addition, although parts of counts two and three may require the application of Philippine law, the proof of both counts may also involve the application of Arizona law. For example, Gates may attempt to prove the unreasonableness of defendants' alleged actions in count two, in part, by demonstrating that Gates properly terminated the distributorship agreement, which proof would require the application of Arizona law. The district court in Arizona is the more efficient forum to resolve such interpretations of Arizona law. See Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd., Osaka, 715 F.2d at 1359; Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, 707 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir.-1983); Insurance Co. of North America v.

Marina Salina Cruz, 649 F.2d at 1273.3

(19) An Arizona court certainly provides Gates with the most convenient forum for seeking relief. Unlike the individual plaintiff in Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime, 707 F.2d at 399, both parties here involve corporate entities apparently with sufficient resources to defend in either country. We therefore give some, but not significant, weight to this factor.

(20) The final factor we consider is the availability of an alternative forum. Gates alleges that it may not receive a fair trial in the Philippines because of the "well publicized violent upheavals"

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3 The Philippines, of course, may be the more efficient forum to apply possible Philippine law questions. Nevertheless, we conclude that Arizona is the more efficient forum because the action is almost ready for trial in Arizona.

there. We note that the "appellants must carry the burden of proving the unavailability of an alternative forum." Olsen By Sheldon v. Mexico, 729 F.2d at 651. We cannot say that Gates has satisfied this burden. In light of the other factors, however, this factor is not dispositive.

(21) After considering all the relevant actors, we conclude that, on balance, the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction over the defendants by a federal district court in Arizona is reasonable. The defendants' numerous visits to Tucson and Jensen's solicitation of the distributorship agreement there demonstrate a purposeful interjection into the state of Arizona. Moreover, defending counts two and three would not burden defendants significantly because they must litigate counts one and four in Arizona anyway. We place some, but not substan-

tial, weight on the convenience to Gates of litigating this dispute in Arizona. Finally, Arizona has an interest in adjudicating this dispute and, at this stage of the litigation, it is the more efficient forum.

In weighing these factors, we are not convinced that adjudication of this dispute in Arizona will affront the sovereignty of the Philippines. Although the availability of an alternative forum supports the defendants' position, the other factors weigh more strongly in Gates' favor. The district court in its order did not weigh these factors, nor did it examine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be reasonable. Under the Data Disc three-prong inquiry, therefore, the district court erred in dismissing counts two and three for lack of personal jurisdiction.

B. Forum Non Conveniens

On November 1, 1983, the district court conditionally dismissed Gates' complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Because the district court had dismissed counts two and three for lack of personal jurisdiction one year earlier, this dismissal pertained only to counts one and four, which allege unauthorized use of Gates' tradenames and trademarks. The dismissal would require Gates to pursue relief in the Philippine courts.

Whether an action may be dismissed for forum non conveniens when jurisdiction is otherwise properly invoked is governed by the factors outlined in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09, 67 S.Ct. 839, 843, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947). The Court divided these factors into "private interest" and "public interest" factors,

each of which must be weighed by the district court. As this court has noted:

> The private interest factors include "the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." ...

The public interest factors include the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies resolved at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is familiar with the law that just govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of law, or in application of foreign law; and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an

unrelated forum with jury duty.

Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir.1983) (citations omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 549, 78 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983).

(22) If a district court properly analyzes and considers all relevant factors and its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its forum non conveniens dismissal "may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 102 S.Ct. 252, 266, 70 L.Ed.2d 419 (1981). A district court, therefore, abuses its discretion when it fails to balance the relevant factors. La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir.1983). "Emphasis on the district court's discretion ... must not overshadow the central principle of the Gilbert doctrine that 'unless the balance

is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.' " Manu International, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc., 641 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.1981) (quoting Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843).

We conclude that the district court did not balance the important relevant factors. The balance of the public and private interest factors is not strongly in favor of the defendants. We therefore hold that the district court's dismissal of counts one and four for forum non conveniens was an abuse of discretion.

1. Private Interest Factors

(23) The district court failed to examine at least two important and

relevant private interest factors. [4] First, the district court did not recognize or consider in its balancing that Gates is a United States citizen and a resident of Arizona. A United States citizen has no absolute right to sue in a United States court. Mizokami Brothers of Arizona, Inc. v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d

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4 The district court correctly began its analysis with a determination of whether there exists an alternative forum. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 254 n. 22, 102 S.Ct. at 265 n. 22; Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d at 1410; Pain v. United Technologies Corp., 637 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C.Cir.1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1128, 102 S.Ct. 980, 71 L.Ed.2d 116 (1981). The court noted that a defendant's amenability to process in the other jurisdiction ordinarily satisfies this requirement. See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07, 67 S.Ct. at 842. We do not overturn the district court's finding of an alternative forum. That an alternative forum exists, however, is not dispositive in the balancing required in a forum non conveniens analysis.

975, 977 (9th Cir.1977) (per curiam), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035, 98 S.Ct. 770, 54 L.Ed.2d 783 (1978). The Supreme Court, however, has observed "that a plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 255, 102 S.Ct. at 265; see Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524, 67 S.Ct. 828, 832, 91 L.Ed. 1067 (1947); Paper Operations Consultants International, Ltd. v. SS Hong Kong Amber, 513 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir.1975). Greater deference is due because "a real showing of convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have shown." Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 255 n. 23, 102 S.Ct. at 266 n. 23 (quoting Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co., 330 U.S. at 524,

67 S.Ct. at 832).

(24) The second relevant private interest factor the district court failed to examine is that the parties were ready for trial when it dismissed the complaint for forum non conveniens. The discovery deadline had passed; all documents needed for trial had been exchanged and/or identified; and all necessary trial documents were located in Tucson, Arizona. The central purpose of any forum non conveniens inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 256, 102 S.Ct. at 266; La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d at 1307. That trial preparation had progressed nearly to the point of trial certainly was a relevant factor when the district court considered whether trial of the case in Arizona would have been more "easy, expeditious and inexpensive" than

trial in the Philippines. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508, 67 S.Ct. at 843. Although no single factor is dispositive, we conclude that the district court's failure to weigh these private interest factors was an abuse of discretion.

(25) We also observe that the private interest factors mentioned by the district court do not strongly support the defendants' position on forum non conveniens. The district court noted that "the vast majority of the witnesses reside in the Philippines ...." Gates Learjet II, slip op. at 9. The defendants, however, admit that the district court was not absolutely correct. In fact, 23 of the 44 witnesses, whom the parties designated in response to interrogatories, reside in the Philippines, which is hardly a "vast majority."

Furthermore, the district court

improperly focused on the number of witnesses in each location. Instead, the court should have examined the materiality and importance of the anticipated witnesses' testimony and then determined their accessibility and convenience to the forum. See La Seguridad v. Transytur Line, 707 F.2d at 1308-09; Thomson & McKinnon v. Minyard, 291 F.Supp. 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y.1968). We also note that a district court should keep in mind that "the increased speed and ease of travel and communication ... makes, especially when a key issue is the location of witnesses, no forum 'as inconvenient (today) as it was in 1947,' " when the Supreme Court decided Gilbert. Manu International, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc., 641 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.1981). We are not convinced that the court here properly considered and weighed this

private interest factor. We therefore cannot give much deference to the district court's consideration of it.5

2. Public Interest Factors

In its consideration of public interest factors, the district court concluded that the Philippines "has a substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation." It reasoned that "most of the operating facts occurred in the

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5 In its discussion of private interest factors, the district court also noted that "almost all of the acts alleged in the complaints and counterclaims occurred in the Philippines." This observation, however, seems to pertain to the Philippines' interest in the action, which is a public interest factor. If the district court was instead referring to the convenience of obtaining certain evidence, it failed to explain what evidence was unavailable. As discussed above, most trial materials were located in Arizona at the time the district court dismissed counts one and four for forum non conveniens.

Philippines," and that "(t)he controversies will require the application of Arizona law and Philippine law." Gates Learjet II, slip op. at 10. Public interest factors properly considered include "the local interest in having localized controversies resolved at home," and "the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is familiar with the law that must govern the action." Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d at 1410.

(26) We nevertheless conclude that the district court's consideration of these public interest factors rested on a mistaken assumption about the applicable law and improperly ignored the advantages of an Arizona forum for the trial. In noting that both Philippine and Arizona law applied to this matter, the district court apparently considered all four counts of the Gates complaint. The

defendants' motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens, however, could pertain only to counts one and four because the court had already dismissed counts two and three for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Counts one and four allege unauthorized use and a conspiracy to make unauthorized use of Gates' tradename and trademark. These counts involve an interpretation of the international distributorship agreement entered into between Gates and LPI. Under the heading, "Post-Termination Actions," the distributorship agreement provides:

> The Distributor shall immediately discontinue the use of any trade names or trademarks referred to in Article III above and shall make no further use of the same nor any other name, title, expression or mark so nearly resembling such trade names or trademarks as to be deceptive in nature.

The distributorship agreement also specifically provides that it shall be

governed by Arizona law. Thus, counts one and four apparently are contract actions that require the application of Arizona law, not Philippine law.6

(27) In addition to making a mistaken assumption about the applicable law, the district court failed to weigh Arizona's interests in having the controversy "resolved at home." Arizona has a significant interest in interpreting its own laws. See Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d at 1411. Arizona also has an interest in protecting its companies from trademark infringement abroad to preserve the state's economic vitality. Although the situs of the alleged trademark and tradename infringement was the Philippines, it appears that Philippine law is not applicable. We therefore conclude

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6 Defendants implicitly admit this point, conceding that Arizona law would apply to a contract action.

that these public interest factors should not weigh heavily in defendants' favor. A proper understanding of the applicable law and the relative interests, in fact, suggests that Arizona has the more substantial interest in this litigation.

(28) The district court particularly emphasized one public interest factor: the docket congestion of its court. It stated:

> Counsel have indicated that there are hundreds, if not thousands, of exhibits involved. There will be many witnesses testifying for both sides. The case will take weeks to try. The Tucson division of the District of Arizona is presently operating with two district judges. Normally there are three judges in the division. The two judges are handling all of the criminal calendar. Outside judges have been assigned to handle part of the civil calendar and it is contemplated that more help will be necessary in the future. Gates Learjet II, slip op. at 10.

This factor also should not weigh heavily in defendants' favor. The real issue is not whether a dismissal will reduce a court's congestion but whether a trial may be speedier in another court because of its less crowded docket. See Starnes v. McGuire, 512 F.2d 918, 932 (D.C.Cir.1974) (en banc); 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure s 3854 at 289-91 (1976); see also Foster v. Litton Industries, Inc., 431 F.Supp. 86, 88 (S.D.N.Y.1977) (relative docket conditions accorded some, but not decisive, weight in transfer motions). The district court here observed only that its docket was congested; it did not determine whether a trial would be speedier in the Philippines. Even if it were, however, it is unfair for a court to subject a United States corporation to the courts of another country merely because

plaintiff's home country courts are congested. The forum non conveniens doctrine should not be used as a solution to court congestion; other remedies, such as placing reasonable limitations on the amount of time each side may have to present evidence, are more appropriate. We hold that the district court failed to consider relevant private and public interest factors and misconstrued others. The district court therefore abused its discretion. On balance, we conclude that the relevant private and public interest factors support the district court's retention of jurisdiction and the dismissal of defendants' forum non conveniens motion.

III. CONCLUSION

Gates cannot demonstrate that the defendants had sufficient activity in

Arizona to establish general jurisdiction. Under the Data Disc three-prong inquiry into limited jurisdiction, however, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing counts two and three for lack of personal jurisdiction. As to the district court's dismissal of counts one and four for forum non conveniens, we find an abuse of discretion. The district court's orders are therefore

REVERSED AND THE CASE IS REMANDED.

[Dated September 27, 1984]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION,	)	
Plaintiffs-Appellants,	)	No. 83-2643
vs.	)	District of Arizona
JAMES B. JENSEN, JR.; RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation, and HAMIX INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a corporation,	)	O R D E R
Defendants-Appellees.	)	

Before: CHOY, PREGERSON, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

The panel as constituted in the above case has voted to deny the petition for rehearing and to reject the suggestion for rehearing en banc.

The full court has been advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc and no judge of the court has voted to grant rehearing en banc. Fed.R.App.P.-35(b).

The petition for rehearing is denied and the suggestion for rehearing en banc is rejected.

[Dated November 27, 1984]

84-1590

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ALEXANDER L. STEVAS,
CLERK

No.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1984

JAMES B. JENSEN, JR.; RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation and HAMIX INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a corporation,

Petitioners,

v.

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

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RULE 28.1 DISCLOSURE

Gates Corporation is the parent company of Gates Learjet Corporation and owns in excess of 50% of the outstanding common stock of Gates Learjet Corporation. Gates Learjet Export Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Gates Learjet Corporation.

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No.

IN THE

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OCTOBER TERM, 1984

JAMES B. JENSEN, JR.; RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation and HAMIX INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a corporation,

Petitioners,

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GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION,

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ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondents, Gates Learjet Corporation and Gates Learjet Export Corporation, respectfully request that this Court deny the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, seeking review of the Ninth Circuit's opinion in this case. That opinion is reported at 743 F.2d 1325 and is attached hereto as Appendix A.

PARTIES

Petitioners' statement of the parties to the proceeding in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals is incorrect. However, the caption of the case in this Court contains the names of all such parties.

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT

Contrary to Petitioners' statement as to this Court's jurisdiction to review the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, jurisdiction in such circumstances is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1254.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Gates Learjet Corporation is the manufacturer of executive aircraft known as Learjets. Gates Learjet Export Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary engaged in international marketing. They will be referred to collectively as "Gates". A large part of the production, administration and distribution occurs in Tucson, Arizona.

James B. Jensen, Jr. ("Jensen") is a United States citizen with residence in California and the Philippines. Ricardo S. Tomacruz ("Tomacruz") is a citizen and resident of the Philippines. Learjet Philippines, Inc. ("LPI") is a Philippine corporation. James B. Jensen & Co., Inc. ("Jensen Inc.") is a California corporation whose principal place of business is San Francisco, California. Hamix International, Ltd. ("Hamix") is a non-resident foreign corporation whose principal place of business is Hong Kong, British Crown Colony. There is substantial evidence that the corporations are mere conduits/alter egos for each other and Jensen and Tomacruz. Respondents' Appendix B. *See also,* Petitioners' Appendix 5.

Jensen is the President of both Jensen, Inc. and LPI. In February of 1978, Jensen travelled to Tucson, Arizona to be on hand when a purchaser accepted delivery of a jet manufactured by Gates. During this visit, Jensen

solicited from Gates the opportunity to become the Learjet distributor in the Republic of the Philippines. Negotiations with regard to this International Distributorship Agreement occurred while Jensen was in Tucson, Arizona, and by telephone, correspondence, and telex from Tucson to San Francisco and Manila.

An International Distributorship Agreement was ultimately entered into between Gates and LPI. This Agreement provides that:

> "It is expressly agreed and understood that this Agreement is an Arizona agreement and that it shall be governed by the laws of the State of Arizona of the United States of America in all matters, including, but not limited to, validity, obligation, interpretation, construction, performance and termination."

The first Agreement was entered into in 1978 for a period of one year or a part thereof, and was in fact renewed for two additional years and finally extended by letter agreement for a period of an additional four months.

During the terms of the Agreements, Jensen and Tomacruz made numerous trips to Arizona on behalf of LPI. Jensen came to Tucson at least seven times between February of 1978 and September of 1981. Among the other contacts, Jensen attended and participated in Gates' annual distributor conferences held in Tucson in 1978, 1979 and 1980. On various other occasions during 1978, 1979 and 1980, Jensen dealt with various Gates personnel at Gates' marketing headquarters and the manufacturing plants located at the Tucson International Airport in Tucson, Arizona. These dealings

were for the purpose of negotiating the purchase of Learjet aircraft, for the purpose of accepting delivery of such aircraft, or for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions under which Jensen and his company would continue to serve as a Gates Learjet distributor.

During the term of the Agreement, LPI and its principals, Jensen and Tomacruz, entered into numerous Airplane Purchase Agreements with Gates in Tucson. Each of these Airplane Purchase Agreements contains a provision stating that:

> "This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with and its performance shall be governed by the laws of the State of Arizona. The courts of Arizona shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims, disputes, actions or suits which may arise hereunder."

Delivery of these airplanes occurred in Tucson, Arizona, with Jensen and/or Tomacruz in attendance.

LPI, Jensen and Tomacruz purchased quantities of spare parts from Gates. These purchases totalled over $200,000.00 for 1980 and 1981 combined.

Additionally, numerous letters, telexes and telephone calls went back and forth between Gates in Tucson and LPI, Jensen and Tomacruz in the Philippines and/or San Francisco.

Gates changed emphasis with its distributors from quota sales to service in 1981, after first so advising all distributors in September of 1980 at an Executive Business Jet national convention.

LPI, as well as all other distributors, was advised to create and maintain service capability. LPI, contrary to requests, never obtained its own hangar, mechanics or tools in its area of distributorship (Manila).

In June, July and August of 1981, written communications and discussions in Tucson took place between Gates and LPI. LPI adopted the position that its borrowed hangar space, borrowed tools and borrowed mechanics enabled it to provide adequate service. In September of 1981, Gates made a tentative decision not to renew LPI's Distributorship Agreement. This decision was finalized on October 15, 1981, by letter to LPI. LPI was one of several distributors not to have its distributorship renewed in 1981.

On October 29, 1981, Gates sent a potential Philippines customer a letter saying Gates would have a demonstration of an executive business jet in Manila, Philippines, in November of 1981.

Gates sent a Learjet to Manila on November 28, 1981, with its far eastern sales representative and two pilots. LPI, upon learning of the demonstration, caused a criminal complaint to be filed against Gates' representative for not having a Philippine business license. As a result, the sales representative was arrested and the jet impounded. As Gates was having the sales representative freed and jet released, LPI filed a lawsuit which further detained the employee and the aircraft. Gates obtained the release of its far eastern representatative on Christmas Eve, 1981.

LPI continued to use the tradename and trademark of Learjet after notice of non-renewal of their

distributorship. The Distributorship Agreement forbids such continued use.

On February 3, 1982, Gates filed a four count complaint in the Pima County Superior Court of the State of Arizona. Defendants in the complaint are LPI and related companies and individuals: Jensen, Tomacruz, Jensen Inc. and Hamix (hereinafter collectively referred to as "Petitioners"). Count One of the complaint alleges unauthorized use of Gates' tradenames and trademarks by all of the Defendants, in violation of Distributorship Agreement, after non-renewal of the Agreement. Count Two is against Jensen and Tomacruz for abuse of process arising out of the seizure by Philippine authorities of an aircraft owned by Gates and the jailing of the Gates employee. Count Three alleges that Jensen and Tomacruz interfered with contractual relations between Gates and customers in the Philippines. Count Four alleges conspiracy by all Defendants to make unauthorized use of Gates' trademark and tradename.

A petition for removal of the action was filed by Jensen and Jensen Inc. The removal was based upon diversity of citizenship.

Jensen and Tomacruz answered and later filed an Amended Counterclaim in six Counts. The Counterclaim added three new parties to the litigation as counter-defendants: B. S. Stillwell, Jane Doe Stillwell, ("Stillwell") and Stillwell Aviation Australia, Pty., Ltd. ("Stillwell Aviation").

On June 30, 1982, Jensen Inc. filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the person. On September 23, 1982 the United States District

Court (Marquez, J) entered an order denying Jensen Inc.'s Motion as to Counts One and Four of the complaint and granting the Motion as to Counts Two and Three.

On April 20, 1983, the remaining Defendants moved the court to clarify that Counts Two and Three were dismissed as to all Defendants because of lack of jurisdiction over their persons. On May 31, 1983 the United States District Court "clarified" its order of September 23, 1982 to reflect that Counts Two and Three were dismissed as to all parties named in those Counts. Gates appealed from that ruling.

The second issue on appeal involved the District Court's dismissal of Counts One and Four of the complaint under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Petitioners did not challenge the convenience of the forum until October 5, 1983, after 18 months of discovery and trial preparation. Gates filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss on October 12, 1983. In a "Memorandum of Decision and Order", dated November 1, 1983, the Court dismissed the complaint, subject to certain conditions.

A Notice of Appeal as to both issues was filed on November 30, 1983. On September 27, 1984, the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, reversed both of these rulings and remanded the action to the District Court for further proceedings. On November 27, 1984, a Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing in Banc was denied.

REASONS WHY THE WRIT SHOULD BE DENIED

I. There are no special or important reasons for granting review on the Writ of Certiorari.

The decision of the Ninth Circuit presents no unique, special or important issues with which to deal. There is no conflict between Federal Courts of Appeals, there is no important question of federal law, nor is there any particularly significant issue to be resolved. The opinion of the Ninth Circuit dealt with two topics: personal jurisdiction and forum non conveniens dismissals.

As to the former, inquiries into the existence or non-existence of personal jurisdiction require case by case determinations which turn on the peculiar facts of each action. There is nothing special about this case which would allow this Court to clarify the law in an area, resolve a conflict, etc.

Contrary to Petitioners' contention, the case of *Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia v. Hall*, ____ U.S. ____, 80 L.Ed.2d 404, 104 S. Ct. 1868 (1984) is not factually similar to the instant case. Neither does it "leave unanswered" a legal question which this case will allow this Court to resolve. Specifically, *Helicopteros Nacionales* is a wrongful death action arising out of a helicopter crash in Peru brought by the survivors of a United States citizen against a Columbian corporation. Substantial and significant factual differences exist between that case and the case at bar which render them inapposite. For example, a wrongful death action involves negligence, rather than intentional acts, which are involved in the present case. Additionally, the action in *Helicopteros Nacionales* did not arise out of a forum-related contract. There was a contract tangentially involved, but it was executed in Columbia not the United States. Indeed, both parties in the *Helicopteros Nacionales* case conceded that the action did not arise out of that contract.

Finally, and most importantly, Petitioners misrepresent, and misstate by selective quotes, the "unanswered question" in the *Helicopteros Nacionales* case, *id.* at fn.10. Petitioners seem to suggest that the *Helicopteros Nacionales* case left open the question of whether a state could exercise "specific jurisdiction" over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum. In fact, this Court in *Helicopteros Nacionales* tacitly recognized and accepted such a status and stated:

> "When a controversy is related to or 'arises out of' a defendant's contacts with the forum, the court has said that a 'relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation' is the essential foundation of in personam jurisdiction." *Id.* at ____, 80 L.Ed.2d at 411, 104 S. Ct. at 1873, Citing to footnote 8.

Footnote 8 reads:

> 'It has been said that when a state exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum, the state is exercising specific jurisdiction over the defendant." (Citations omitted). *Id.*

Additionally, the general jurisdiction/specific jurisdiction distinction was acknowledged in *Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc.*, ____ U.S. ____, 79 L.Ed.2d 790, 104 S.Ct. 1473 (1984) wherein the Court stated:

> "In the instant case, respondent's activities in the forum may not be so substantial as to support jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to those activities. But respondent is carrying on a 'part of its general business' in New Hampshire, and that

> is sufficient to support jurisdiction when the cause of action arises out of the very activity being conducted, in part, in New Hampshire." *Id.* at ____, 79 L.Ed.2d at 801, 104 S.Ct. 1473

The answered question referred to in footnote 10 of *Helicopteros Nacionales* is not whether there is a distinction between general and specific jurisdiction, but rather "whether the terms 'arising out of' and 'related to' describe different connections between a cause of action and a defendant's contacts with the forum" for the purposes of exercising specific jurisdiction. (This particular section of footnote 10 was deleted by Petitioners and an elipses substituted). Thus, rather than not deciding whether specific jurisdiction (or "limited jurisdiction" as the Ninth Circuit labels it) exists as a concept, this Court simply left open a sub-issue of that inquiry. That sub-issue is not raised in the current case.

As to the forum non conveniens issue, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's dismissal of the remaining counts of the complaint, Counts One and Four. The District Court desired that these Counts be tried in the Philippines. This ruling also presents no unique or important matters of law for this Court to address. If the case goes on to trial in Tucson, as currently planned, Petitioners will incur no real prejudice because there is nothing wrong or unfair about Tucson as a forum. Petitioners have never questioned their ability to get a fair trial in Tucson, so justice can ultimately be obtained in that location. Additionally, there is no absolute right to a change of forum for convenience sake. Since it is a discretionary matter, Petitioners' inability to obtain a different forum does not impact any of its "rights", nor is it violative of due process.

Finally, one of the thrusts of Petitioners' argument regarding forum non conveniens is that the Court of Appeals did not consider the effect of bringing Counts Two and Three back into the case when it reviewed the propriety of the forum non conveniens dismissal of Counts One and Four. Petitioners contend that, when the aggregation of all four counts is considered, it is clear that the Philippines is the more appropriate forum for the entire case. However, it is not for an Appellate Court to make that inquiry. The question has never been decided by the District Court and, until it has, appellate review is premature and improper.

II. The decision of the Ninth Circuit was correct.

A. Arizona has personal jurisdiction over LPI, Jensen and Tomacruz as to Count Two of the Complaint, and personal jurisdiction over Jensen and Tomacruz as to Count Three of the Complaint.

The Ninth Circuit opinion reveals a well reasoned discussion of the specific facts of this case and a proper application of the prevailing law on personal jurisdiction to those facts. The decision of the District Court dismissing Counts Two and Three of the complaint on personal jurisdiction grounds was properly reversed.

Petitioner contends that there is some infirmity with the opinion of the Court of Appeals because it focuses only on the forum-related contacts of "Learjet Philippines, Inc. (by and through petitioners Jensen and Tomacruz) . . . Yet it reversed the dismissal of Counts II and III as to all defendants." Writ of Certioriari, page 12. This argument fails to recognize that Counts Two and Three only involve LPI, Jensen and Tomacruz (Count Two is against all three of these parties and Count Three is only against Jensen and Tomacruz).

Contrary to Petitioners' assertion, there was a plethora of evidence regarding the contacts these parties had with the forum state of Arizona. A number of these contacts are enumerated in the Court of Appeals decision. Petitioners' outline of their contacts with Arizona contained at pages 12-14 of the writ is misleading and inaccurate. For example, as to Jensen, Inc., Petitioners claim that the only evidence of contact was that Jensen, Inc. purchased spare parts from Gates in Wichita, Kansas and relayed LPI's mail through its San Francisco office. However, it is readily apparent from a review of the facts that Jensen, on behalf of Jensen, Inc., transacted business in the state of Arizona and that Jensen, Inc. and LPI were used by Jensen interchangeably with a total disregard of their separate corporate entities. *See* Appendix B. Even the District Court, when it dismissed Counts Two and Three, spent several pages examining the forum-related conduct of Jensen, Inc. and concluded that:

> "The distributorship agreement was entered into only after lengthy and thorough negotiation process, during which Jensen, Inc., through its president, participated fully . . . . Jensen, Inc. aggressively solicited the distributorship contract, conducting a well-planned and persuasive promotional campaign to secure the distributorship from GLC. Defendant, therefore, 'purposely availed himself of the privilege of conducting' its working relationship with GLC within Arizona, not only in person, but through the mail, telephone and wire services." Petitioners' Appendix No. 5 at pages 8 and 9.

The District Court in that Order also concluded that "Jensen, Inc. is an active member in the marketing activity which is the subject matter of the distributorship

agreement." *Id.* at page 5. Because Petitioners' description of forum related activities varies widely from the facts, it is respectfully requested that this Court rely upon the jurisdictional facts as outlined in the decision of the Court of Appeals and in the Statement of Facts contained herein.

Petitioners also contend that jurisdiction over Jensen and Tomacruz is based upon the conduct of LPI, and that such exercise is unfair, citing *Russ v. Savchuk,* 444 U.S. 320, 62 L.Ed.2d 516, 100 S.Ct. 571 (1980) and *Powder Horn Nursery, Inc. v. Soil and Plant Laboratory, Inc.,* 20 Ariz.App. 517, 514 P.2d 270 (1973). However, these cases are inapposite both factually and legally. *Russ v. Savchuk* involved an attempt by a party injured in an automobile accident to obtain jurisdiction over the tortfeasor, over whom there was otherwise no personal jurisdiction, by garnishing the tortfeasor's insurance company, which did business in the forum. Obviously, that case has no relevance here. In *Powder Horn Nursery, Inc.,* the plaintiff was seeking to obtain jurisdiction over corporate employees whose only involvement was in their capacity as employees of the defendant corporation. The Court noted that there was nothing to indicate that the defendant corporate entity was used as a sham or in any manner which would justify disregarding its existence. The Court also observed that none of the individual defendants had conducted activities in Arizona. In the present case, the individuals are being sued

for their actions as individuals[1], allegations have been made and evidence produced indicating that the corporate entities are a sham, and the individual Petitioners themselves conducted activities in Arizona. It should be noted that this Court recently rejected the suggestion that corporate employees who act in their official capacity are somehow shielded from suit in their individual capacity. *Calder v. Jones*, ____ U.S. ____, 79 L.Ed.2d 804, 104 S.Ct. 1482 (1984). The Petitioners are correct that their contacts with Arizona are not to be judged according to their employers' activities there. "On the other hand, their status as employees does not somehow insulate them from jurisdiction." *Id.* at ____, 79 L.Ed.2d at 813, 104 S.Ct. 1482.

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[1] Petitioners seem to suggest that Jensen and Tomacruz would not be subject to personal liability because they can hide behind the corporate shields of Jensen, Inc. and LPI. There are two problems with this argument. The first is that there is an allegation that the corporate form should be disregarded and the corporate veil should be pierced. Secondly, Jensen and Tomacruz are officers of Learjet Philippines and Jensen is an officer of Jensen Inc. Corporate officers are individually liable for torts which they personally commit and they cannot shield themselves behind the corporation when they are actual participants in the tort. *Solo Cup Company v. Paper Machinery Corp.*, 359 F.2d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 1966). The principal applies where the conduct constitutes unauthorized use of tradenames and trademarks; *Mead Johnson & Co. v. Baby's Formula Service, Inc.*, 402 F.2d 19, 23 (5th Cir. 1968); *Steak & Brew, Inc. v. Makins*, 177 U.S.P.Q. 412 (D. Conn. 1963); or abuse of process/false imprisonment/malicious prosecution. *Burke v. Musarra*, 46 Misc.2d 933, 261 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1965); *Freides v. Sani-Mode Manufacturing Co.*, 33 Ill.2d 291, 211 N.E.2d 296 (1965). Thus, Jensen and Tomacruz's wrongful conduct subjects them to personal liability and, since they personally have sufficient contact with Arizona, personal jurisdiction.

Petitioners' also question the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the dismissed Counts "arise out of" the distributorship agreement. The Petitioners particularly impugn such a decision as to Count Two of the complaint (abuse of process). However, the Court of Appeals examined the complaint in the Philippines upon which the abuse of process count is based and duly noted that all three counts of that action seek various damages as a result of Gates' non-renewal of the Distributorship Agreement. Clearer evidence that the abuse of process arose out of the agreement is hard to imagine.

Petitioners final contention of error with regard to the Ninth Circuit's decision on personal jurisdiction is that a recent case, *Helicopteros Nacionales, supra,* is supportive of a contrary decision. However, by its explicit terms, the *Helicopteros Nacionales* decision was limited to the issue of whether *general jurisdiction* existed over the Columbian defendant, it being conceded that specific or limited jurisdiction did not apply. In the case at hand, the Court of Appeals ruled in Petitioners' favor on the issue of general jurisdiction. Thus, *Helicopteros Nacionales* has no application to this case in its current posture.

In addition to the numerous forum related contacts, another aspect of this case which makes exercise of jurisdiction particularly reasonable, as the Court of Appeals noted, is the fact that Petitioners would still have to litigate Counts One and Four of the complaint and their Six Count Counterclaim. With all those issues remaining, the addition of two more counts is not unduly burdensome.

It is clear from the foregoing that the Court of Ap-

peals decision with regard to personal jurisdiction was well reasoned and should stand as a legitimate application of the specific facts to the applicable law. Review is inappropriate.

B. The Court of Appeals properly concluded that the District Court abused its discretion in granting the forum non conveniens dismissal.

The Court of Appeals properly applied the abuse of discretion standard in reversing the District Court. In establishing the abuse of discretion standard, this Court noted that:

> "[W]here the court has considered all relevant public and private interest factors, and where its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its decision deserves substantial deference."

Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257, 70 L.Ed.2d 419, 436, 102 S.Ct. 252 (1981). Thus, a District Court abuses its discretion, and is subject to reversal, when it does not consider all the relevant factors and/or where its balancing of these factors is unreasonable. *La Seguridad v. Transyt Line*, 707 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1983). "Emphasis on the District Court's discretion . . . must not overshadow the central principle of the *Gilbert* doctrine that 'unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.'" *Manu International, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc.*, 641 F.2d 62, 65 (2nd Cir. 1981) (quoting *Gulf Oil v. Gilbert*, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839, 843, 91 L.Ed 1055, 1062 (1947)).

In analyzing the District Court's consideration of the private interest factors, the Court of Appeals ob-

served that the District Court totally failed to examine at least two important factors. First, the District Court did not recognize or consider in its balancing that Gates is a United States citizen and a resident of Arizona. The second relevant private interest factor that the District Court failed to examine was that the parties were ready for trial when the Court dismissed the complaint for forum non conveniens. A prompt trial of the case in Arizona would have been more "easy,, expeditious and inexpensive" than trial in the Philippines.

In addition to not considering at all the two aforementioned factors, the District Court did not properly consider and weigh the private interest factor of location of witnesses. Specifically, the District Court mischaracterized where the balance of the witnesses were located and incorrectly emphasized the number, rather than the materiality, of the witnesses.[2]

As to the public interest factors, the Court of Appeals concluded that the District Court failed to consider one such factor, was mistaken as to another and unreasonably overemphasized a third. Specifically, the District Court totally failed to weigh Arizona's interest in having the controversy resolved at home. The District Court also mistakenly concluded that both Philippine and Arizona law would apply to the matter, when in fact only Arizona law would apply. The only remaining Counts of the complaint involved unauthorized use of tradenames and trademarks in violation of the Distributorship

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[2] Petitioners have to this day failed to identify a single Philippine witness who they would like to utilize whose testimony would be unavailable in Tucson, let alone identify the content, necessity or materiality of that testimony.

Agreement. As previously noted, the Distributorship Agreement specifically provides that it shall be governed by Arizona law. Indeed, contrary to their assertion in their petition, Petitioners conceded that Arizona law would apply to these Counts. This occurred in Petitioners' Reply Memorandum Regarding the Motion to Dismiss for Forum Non Conveniens at page 4, line 6-8:

> "Defendant/Counterclaimants do not disagree that Arizona law applies to at least one of the plaintiffs' claims (the breach of contract)." Appendix C.

The Court of Appeals also concluded that the District Court overemphasized its own crowded docket in dismissing the action. The Court of Appeals correctly observed that it is unreasonable and unfair for a court to subject a United States corporation to the courts of another country merely because the plaintiff's home country's courts are congested.

In conclusion, the Court of Appeals held that the District Court failed to consider relevant private and public interest factors and unreasonably misconstrued others. The District Court therefore abused its discretion and the case was properly reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

CONCLUSION:

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit authored a very well reasoned opinion in a case that is peculiarly fact specific. This case offers no important matters of general interest nor any significant legal issues about which there is a conflict amongst the circuits, nor any issue which calls for action by the Supreme Court. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no

"unanswered question" in *Helicopteros Nacionales* that could be resolved by granting certiorari in this case. With regard to the forum non conveniens inquiry, the Court of Appeals properly applied an abuse of discretion standard, as enunciated by this Court for use in these specific situations, and concluded that such abuse occurred. Since a defendant has no absolute right to a forum non conveniens dismissal, an important right is not being affected. Finally, the ultimate forum, the Federal District Court in Tucson, Arizona, is a place where both sides can obtain a just and final result. The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Dated April 1, 1985.

By _____

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CERTIFICATE OF FILING AND SERVICE

STATE OF ARIZONA)
) ss.
COUNTY OF PIMA)

I, WILLIAM H. TINNEY, one of the attorneys for Respondents, and a member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States, hereby certify that on this 1st day of April, 1985, 40 copies of Respondents' Brief in Opposition were mailed, postage prepaid, to the Clerk of the Supreme Court of the United States, within the time allowed for filing same.

I also certify that on this 1st day of April, 1985, 3 copies of the Respondents' Brief in Opposition were mailed, postage prepaid, to Herbert Mallamo and Gary F. Howard, 4041 North Central Avenue, Suite 2001, Phoenix, Arizona 85012, attorneys for the Petitioners.

I further certify that all parties required to be served have been served.

WILLIAM H. TINNEY

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 1st day of April, 1985 by William H. Tinney.

My Commission Expires:

Notary Public

APPENDIX

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION, *Plaintiffs/Appellants,* vs. JAMES B. JENSEN, JR.; RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation, and HAMIX INTERNATIONAL, LTD., a corporation, *Defendants/Apellees.*	)	**No. 83-2643** **DC No. CIV 82-139** **OPINION**

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

ALFREDO C. MARQUEZ, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

ARGUED AND SUBMITTED MAY 14, 1984

Before: CHOY, PREGERSON, and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges.

CHOY, Circuit Judge:

The issues on this appeal are (1) whether the district court properly dismissed counts two and three of appellant's complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, and (2) whether the district court's dismissal of counts

one and four for *forum non conveniens* was an abuse of discretion. On both issues, we reverse and remand to the district court.

I. BACKGROUND

Gates Learjet Corporation and Gates Learjet Export Corporation ("Gates") entered into an international distributorship agreement with Learjet Philippines, Inc. ("LPI") in 1978. Gates, principally located in Tucson, Arizona, manufactures executive aircraft known as Learjets. LPI is a Philippine corporation. The original agreement was for a period of one year but was renewed for an additional two years and four months.

James B. Jensen, Jr., a United States citizen with residence in California and the Philippines, is the president of LPI and James B. Jensen & Co. ("Jensen, Inc."), a California corporation located in San Francisco. The negotiations for the international distributorship agreement occurred both in Tucson, when Jensen visited Gates, and by telephone, correspondence, and telex from Tucson to Manila and San Francisco. The agreement provides that it "is an Arizona agreement and that it shall be governed by the laws of the State of Arizona of the United States of America in all matters, included but not limited to, validity, obligation, interpretation, construction, performance and termination."

During the time the agreement was in effect, Jensen and Ricardo S. Tomacruz, the vice-president and general manager of LPI and a citizen and resident of the Philippines, made several trips to Tucson on behalf of LPI. The purposes of Jensen's visits, which numbered at least seven between February 1978 and September 1981, in-

cluded arrangement of an aircraft sale, meetings with Gates employees, and attendance at Gates' international distributor conference and the delivery of several airplanes. LPI also entered into several airplane purchase agreements with Gates in Tucson. Each agreement contained a choice of law provision specifying Arizona and a choice of forum provision that the "courts of Arizona shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims, disputes, actions, or suits which may arise hereunder." In addition, LPI and Jensen, Inc. purchased over $200,000 in spare parts from Gates.

In 1981, Gates did not renew the international distributorship agreement with LPI. On February 3, 1982, Gates filed a four-count complaint in an Arizona state court against Jensen, Tomacruz, LPI, Jensen, Inc., and Hamix International Ltd., a Hong Kong corporation ("defendants"). Count one of the complaint alleges unauthorized use of Gates' tradenames and trademarks. Count two alleges abuse of process arising out of the seizure by Philippine authorities of a Gates' aircraft and the jailing of its pilot. Count three alleges interference with contractual relations between Gates and customers in the Philippines. Count four alleges a conspiracy to make unauthorized use of Gates' tradename and trademark. The action was removed to a federal district court for diversity of citizenship.

On September 23, 1982, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed counts two and three for lack of personal jurisdiction as to one of the defendants, Jensen, Inc. *Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen,* No. CIV 82-139 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 1982) *(Gates Learjet I).* After this partial dismissal, the defendants answered the complaint and filed a six-count counter-

claim. The counterclaim alleges improper termination of the distributorship agreement, unjust enrichment, interference with contractual-relations, and defamation. It added three parties to the litigation: B. S. Stillwell, Jane Doe Stillwell, and Stillwell Aviation Australia Party, Ltd. On May 31, 1983, the district court clarified its earlier dismissal order and dismissed counts two and three as to all of the defendants.

On October 5, 1983, after 18 months of trial preparation, the defendants challenged the convenience of the forum. The defendants allege that two civil actions pending in Philippine courts make the same allegations as the action brought by Gates in Arizona. On November 1, 1983, the district court conditionally dismissed counts one and four of the complaint under the doctrine of *forum non conveniens*. The court dismissed Gates' complaint on the following conditions: 1) The Philippine courts accept jurisdiction; 2) the defendants submit to that jurisdiction; 3) the defendants make their employees available for process and as witnesses; 4) the defendants waive any newly arisen statute of limitations defenses; 5) the defendants recognize any Philippine court judgment; and 6) all discovery and products may be used in any action in the Philippines, subject to objections which could be made in this court. *Gates Learjet Corp. v. Jensen*, No. CIV 82-139, slip op. at 11 (D. Ariz. Nov. 1, 1983) *(Gates Learjet II)*.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Personal Jurisdiction

The district court dismissed counts two and three of Gates' complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction. As the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of the court,

Gates has the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction. *Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc.*, 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977).[1] Arizona's long-arm statute establishes personal jurisdiction over over nonresidents to the maximum extent permitted by due process. *Houghton v. Piper Aircraft Corp.*, 112 Ariz. 365, 542 P.2d 24, 26 (1975). Due process requires the defendants to have certain minimum contacts with the forum so that maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. *International Shoe Co. v. Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); *Colonial Leasing Co. v. Pugh Brothers Garage*,

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[1] Gates contends that the defendants waived any objection to personal jurisdiction when they invoked the jurisdiction of this court by asking for affirmative relief in a permissive counterclaim. The courts are divided on the issue of whether the assertion of a permissive counterclaim should constitute a waiver of a jurisdictional defense. *Compare North Branch Products, Inc. v. Fisher*, 284 F.2d 611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (waiver) and *Merz v. Hemmerle*, 90 F.R.D. 566, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (waiver) *with Neifeld v. Steinberg*, 438 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1971) (no waiver) *and Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.*, 566 F.Supp. 846, 851 (E.D. Ark. 1983) (no waiver). *See generally Annot.*, 17 A.L.R. Fed. 390 (1973). Although this court has held that the defendant's assertion of a compulsory counterclaim "does not constitute a waiver of any jurisdictional defense he previously or concurrently asserts," *Dragor Shipping Corp. v. Union Tank Car Co.*, 378 F.2d 241, 244 (9th Cir. 1967), we have not decided whether the assertion of a permissive counterclaim constitutes a waiver.

As to defendant Jensen, Inc., this case is easily resolved because Jensen, Inc. brought a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction prior to the filing of the answer and counterclaim. *See Neifeld v. Steinberg*, 438 F.2d at 428 n.10 (clearly no waiver when jurisdictional defenses raised by motion prior to filing of answer).

735 F.2d 380, 383 (9th Cir. 1984). To satisfy this due process requirement, Gates may prove "general jurisdiction" or "limited jurisdiction."

1. GENERAL JURISDICTION

A sufficient relationship between the defendants and Arizona exists to support general jurisdiction if Gates can demonstrate that the defendants' activities within Arizona are "substantial" or "continuous and systematic." *See Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc.*, 557 F.2d at 1287. We review the district court's holding that Jensen "does not transact business within Arizona on a continuous or systematic basis, and does not provide the kind of contacts that would sustain exercise of general jurisdiction." *Gates Learjet I*, slip op. at 7.

The other defendants, however, did not raise the jurisdictional defense until they filed their answer and counterclaim. Nevertheless, we hold that the filing of a permissive counterclaim does not constitute a waiver of a personal jurisdiction defense asserted in the same pleading. Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly authorizes a defendant to join a jurisdictional defense with a counterclaim without waiving this defense. The rule permits a defendant to raise jurisdictional defenses by motion or by answer. If we were to find a waiver when a defendants files a permissive counterclaim in the same pleading in which he asserts jurisdictional defenses, the purposes behind Rule 12(b) — to avoid the delay caused by successive motions and pleadings and to reverse the prior practices of asserting jurisdictional defenses by "special appearances" — would be thwarted. *See Neifeld v. Steinberg*, 438 F.2d at 429. Moreover, courts have noted that when the rule makers wanted to attach "waiver" consequences in certain situations, they did so explicitly. *See Id.* at 428 & n.11; *Lomanco, Inc. v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.*, 566 F.Supp. at 850.

Gates cites five activities to prove that defendants' contacts with Arizona were "continuous and systematic" and "substantial": 1) Jensen solicited the distributorship agreement in Arizona; 2) the defendants visited Tucson a number of times; 3) the airplane purchase agreements between Gates and Jensen contained an Arizona choice of law and forum provision; 4) the defendants purchased spare parts from Gates in Tucson; and 5) the defendants sent many letters and telexes and made numerous telephone calls to Tucson.

We must decide whether these contacts constitute sufficient activity in Arizona to conclude that the defendants "may in fact be said already to be 'present' there." *Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co.*, 556 F.2d 406, 413 (9th Cir. 1977). Moreover, we must focus upon the "economic reality" of the defendants' activities rather than a mechanical checklist. *See Thos. P. Gonzales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional*, 614 F.2d 1247, 1254 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting *Foster v. Mooney Aircraft Corp.*, 68 Cal. App.3d 887, 137 Cal. Rptr. 694, 697 (1977)).

We conclude that the "economic reality" here is that defendants' activities in Arizona were not "continuous and systematic" or "substantial". Jensen's solicitation of the distributorship agreement in Arizona and the defendants' visits to Tucson do not constitute "conducting business" in Arizona. *See Rocke v. Canadian Automobile Sport Club*, 660 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1981). Making telephone calls and sending telexes and letters to Tucson are not activities which support a finding of general jurisdiction. *See Thos. P. Gonzales Corp. v. Consejo Nacional*, 614 F.2d at 1254. Furthermore, the choice of forum provision in the airplane purchase agreement applies only to disputes arising out of those agreements.

Significantly, the defendants did not establish a regular place of business in Arizona. *See Rocke v. Canadian Automobile Sport Club,* 660 F.2d at 399. These contacts in their totality do not demonstrate sufficient activity in Arizona to support general jurisdiction. Defendants' activities in Arizona were more occasional than continuous, and more infrequent than systematic.

2. LIMITED JURISDICTION

If a defendant's activities are not so pervasive to subject them to general jurisdiction, this court makes the following evaluation in determining whether there is limited jurisdiction:

> (1) The nonresident defendant must do some act or consummate some transaction with the forum or perform some act by which he purposely avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.
>
> (2) The claim must be one which arises out of or results from the defendant's forum-related activities.
>
> (3) Exercise of jurisdiction must be reasonable.

Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates, Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1287 (9th Cir. 1977).

Gates clearly satisfies the first prong of this test. Not only did Jensen solicit the distributorship agreement in Arizona, but also the agreement specifically provides that Arizona law governs it. The distributorship agreement, therefore, directly invokes the benefits and protections of Arizona laws. *See O'Hare International Bank v. Hampton,* 437 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1971); *Alchemie*

International, Inc. v. Metal World, Inc., 523 F.Supp. 1039, 1054 (D.N.J. 1981). Given these circumstances, Jensen should have reasonably anticipated "being haled into court" in Arizona. *See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson*, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).

Prong two of the *Data Disc* inquiry requires that each claim "arises out of or results from" the defendants' forum related activity. 557 F.2d at 1287. The district court had the most trouble with this part of the test, stating:

> The claims of counts two and three, sounding in tort law, cannot be said to arise out of the distributorship agreement. These claims result from the conduct of defendant outside the state, and are too attenuated a contact to justify exercise of personal jurisdiction.

Gates Learjet I, slip op. at 10. After examining the record, we conclude that the district court erred in finding that the claims in counts two and three are "too attenuated a contact" to justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction.

Count two of Gates' complaint alleges that the defendants filed two civil actions and one criminal complaint in the Philippines which caused the seizure of one of Gates' Learjets and the arrest of one of its employees. Count two alleges further that these actions were meant to harass, intimidate and threaten Gates and constitute an abuse of process. At first blush, this count may appear to be unrelated to the distributorship agreement. An examination of the complaint that the defendants filed in the Philippines on December 1, 1981, however, dispels any doubt that this count "arises out of" the distributorship agreement.

The first cause of action in the Philippines complaint alleges that Gates' nonrenewal of the distributorship agreement with the defendants was "clearly contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy and public order." The second cause of action alleges "moral" and reputation damages for Gates' bad faith in refusing to renew the distributorship agreement. The third cause of action alleges wanton and fraudulent behavior in refusing to negotiate the renewal of the distributorship agreement. Thus, count two of Gates' complaint arose out of the distributorship agreement because its termination induced defendants' alleged harassment and intimidation of Gates. Count two was not too attenuated from the distributorship agreement to support a finding of limited jurisdiction.

We similarly conclude that count three of Gates' complaint satisfies the second prong of the *Data Disc* test. Count three alleges that the defendants interfered with Gates' contractual relations with its customers in the Philippines. This count also arises out of the distributorship agreement because its factual basis concerns whether Jensen improperly used Gates' tradenames contrary to the terms of the distributorship agreement.[2]

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[2] Gates cites cases that interpret an Arizona attorney's fee statute and hold that tort claims arise ou of a contract if they could not exist "but for" the contract. *See, e.g., Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance Co.*, 132 Ariz. 529, 544, 647 P.2d 1127, 1141 (1982), *cert. denied*, 459 U.S. 1070 (1982). Although these cases interpret the "arises out of" language in a manner that supports Gates' construction, Gates never demonstrates why this court, in applying a constitutional due process test, should adopt an Arizona court's interpretation of an irrelevant state statute.

The third and final prong of the *Data Disc* inquiry requires a court's exercise of jurisdiction to be reasonable. 557 F.2d at 1287. This court has identified seven factors as pertinent to the reasonableness inquiry:

> (A) the extent of the defendant's purposeful interjection into the forum state; (B) the burden of defending in the forum state; (C) the extent of the conflict with the sovereignty of the defendant's state; (D) the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute; (E) the most efficient judicial resolution of the controversy; (F) the importance of the forum to the plaintiff's interest in convenient and effective relief; and (G) the existence of an alternative forum.

Rocke v. Canadian Automobile Sport Club, 660 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1981); *see Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz*, 649 F.2d 1266, 1270 (9th Cir. 1981). "These factors are not mandatory tests, each of which plaintiff must pass in order for a court properly to assume jurisdiction. Instead, the factors illuminate the considerations of fairness and due process set forth in *International Shoe*, 326 U.S. at 310." *Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd., Osaka*, 715 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1983).

The application of these factors to this case convinces us that it would be reasonable to subject the defendants to the jurisdiction of the Arizona court. We consider each of the factors in turn.

Although not extensive enough to support general jurisdiction, the contacts of LPI, Jensen, and Tomacruz with Arizona are sufficient to demonstrate a purposeful interjection into the forum state. Jensen solicited an inter-

national distributorship agreement in Tucson, which contained a choice of law provision specifying Arizona. Both Jensen and Tomacruz made several visits to the Gates' facilities and even accepted delivery of airplanes in Tucson. Moreover, these airplane purchase agreements contained choice of law and forum provisions, both of which specified Arizona. Thus, the terms of important contracts between Gates and the defendants demonstrate that the defendants had notice that they might be brought into a court in Arizona.

The burden on the defendants of defending in Arizona, as opposed to the Philippines, is potentially significant. Litigating abroad imposes significant inconveniences upon the party appearing in a foreign country. *Olsen By Sheldon v. Mexico*, 729 F.2d 641, 650 (9th Cir. 1984). We nevertheless conclude that the burden on the defendants would not be substantial here, primarily because the defendants must litigate in Arizona anyway. The district court found personal jurisdiction as to counts one and four. The extra burden of defending counts two and three in Arizona, particularly in light of their connection to counts one and four, would be minimal.

The reasonableness of jurisdiction depends also in part upon the seriousness of the potential affront to the sovereignty of the defendants' state. A foreign nation presents a higher sovereignty barrier than that between two states within our union. *Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz*, 649 F.2d at 1272. Two of the three defendants named in counts two and three are residents of the Philippines. The government of the Philippines clearly has an interest in resolving disputes that involve its citizens. Nevertheless, we note that this factor is not dispositive because, if given controlling

weight, it would always prevent suit against a foreign national in a United States Court.

We examine next Arizona's interest in adjudicating this dispute. Arizona has a strong interest in ensuring that its citizens are fully compensated for their injuries, in part to protect the state's economic resources from unnecessary expenditures. *See Olsen By Sheldon v. Mexico,* 729 F.2d at 651.

At the current stage of the litigation, Arizona would appear to be the more efficient forum to resolve this dispute. Gates alleges, and defendants do not dispute, that discovery is completed and "this matter could be tried in a matter of weeks." In addition, although parts of counts two and three may require the application of Philippine law, the proof of both counts may also involve the application of Arizona law. For example, Gates may attempt to prove the unreasonableness of defendants' alleged actions in count two, in part, by demonstrating that Gates properly terminated the distributorship agreement, which proof would require the application of Arizona law. The district court in Arizona is the more efficient forum to resolve such interpretations of Arizona law. *See Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., Ltd., Osaka,* 715 F.2d at 1359; *Raffaele v. Compagnie General Maritime,* 707 F.2d 395, 399 (9th Cir. 1983); *Insurance Co. of North America v. Marina Salina Cruz,* 649 F.2d at 1273.[3]

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[3] The Philippines, of course, may be the more efficient forum to apply possible Philippine law questions. Nevertheless, we conclude that Arizona is the more efficient forum because the action is almost ready for trial in Arizona.

An Arizona court certainly provides Gates with the most convenient forum for seeking relief. Unlike the individual plaintiff in *Raffaele v. Compagnie Generale Maritime,* 707 F.2d at 399, both parties here involve corporate entities apparently with sufficient resources to defend in either country. We therefore give some, but not significant, weight to this factor.

The final factor we consider is the availability of an alternative forum. Gates alleges that it may not receive a fair trial in the Philippines because of the "well publicized violent upheavals" there. We note that the "appellants must carry the burden of proving the unavailability of an alternative forum." *Olsen By Sheldon v. Mexico,* 729 F.2d at 651. We cannot say that Gates has satisfied this burden. In light of the other factors, however, this factor is not dispositive.

After considering all the relevant factors, we conclude that, on balance, the exercise of limited personal jurisdiction over the defendants by a federal district court in Arizona is reasonable. The defendants' numerous visits to Tucson and Jensen's solicitation of the distributorship agreement there demonstrate a purposeful interjection into the state of Arizona. Moreover, defending counts two and three would not burden defendants significantly because they must litigate counts one and four in Arizona anyway. We place some, but not substantial, weight on the convenience to Gates of litigating this dispute in Arizona. Finally, Arizona has an interest in adjudicating this dispute and, at this stage of the litigation, it is the more efficient forum.

In weighing these factors, we are not convinced that adjudication of this dispute in Arizona will affront the

sovereignty of the Philippines. Although the availability of an alternative forum supports the defendants' position, the other factors weigh more strongly in Gates' favor. The district court in its order did not weigh these factors, nor did it examine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be reasonable. Under the *Data Disc* three-prong inquiry, therefore, the district court erred in dismissing counts two and three for lack of personal jurisdiction.

B. Forum Non Conveniens

On November 1, 1983, the district court conditionally dismissed Gates' complaint under the doctrine of *forum non conveniens.* Because the district court had dismissed counts two and three for lack of personal jurisdiction one year earlier, this dismissal pertained only to counts one and four, which allege unauthorized use of Gates' tradenames and trademarks. The dismissal would require Gates to pursue relief in the Philippine courts.

Whether an action may be dismissed for *forum non conveniens* when jurisdiction is otherwise properly invoked is governed by the factors outlined in *Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,* 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947). The Court divided these factors into "private interest" and "public interest" factors, each of which must be weighed by the district court. As this court has noted:

> The private interest factors include "the relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious and inexpensive." . . . The public interest factors in-

> clude the administrative difficulties flowing from court congestion; the local interest in having localized controversies resolved at home; the interest in having the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is familiar with the law that must govern the action; the avoidance of unnecessary problems in conflicts of law, or in application of foreign law, and the unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty.

Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted), *cert. denied*, 104 S.Ct. 549 (1983).

If a district court properly analyzes and considers all relevant factors and its balancing of these factors is reasonable, its *forum non conveniens* dismissal "may be reversed only when there has been a clear abuse of discretion." *Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981). A district court, therefore, abuses its discretion when it fails to balance the relevant factors. *La Seguridad v. Transytur Line*, 707 F.2d 1304, 1308 (11th Cir. 1983). "Emphasis on the district court's discretion . . . must not overshadow the central principle of the *Gilbert* doctrine that 'unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.'" *Manu International, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc.*, 641 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (quoting *Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert*, 330 U.S. at 508).

We conclude that the district court did not balance the important relevant factors. The balance of the public and private interest factors is not strongly in favor of the defendants. We therefore hold that the district court's dismissal of counts one and four for *forum non convenier* was an abuse of discretion.

1. PRIVATE INTEREST FACTORS

The district court failed to examine at least two important and relevant private interest factors.[4] First, the district court did not recognize or consider in its balancing that Gates is a United States citizen and a resident of Arizona. A United States citizen has no absolute right to sue in a United States court. *Mizokami Brothers of Arizona, Inc. v. Baychem Corp.*, 556 F.2d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), *cert. denied*, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978). The Supreme Court, however, as observed "that a plaintiff's choice of forum is entitled to greater deference when the plaintiff has chosen the home forum." *Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. at 255; *see Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co.*, 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947); *Paper Operations Consultants International, Ltd. v. SS Hong Kong Amber*, 513 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1975). Greater deference is due because "a real showing of convenience by a plaintiff who has sued in his home forum will normally outweigh the inconvenience the defendant may have shown." *Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. at 255 n.23 (quoting *Koster v. Lumbermens Mutual Co.*, 330 U.S. at 524).

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[4] The district court correctly began its analysis with a determination of whether there exists an alternative forum. *See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22; *Cheng v. Boeing Co.*, 708 F.2d at 1410; *Pain v. United Technologies Corp.*, 637 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir. 1980), *cert. denied*, 454 U.S. 1128 (1981). The court noted that a defendant's amenability to process in the other jurisdiction ordinarily satisfies this requirement. *See Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert*, 330 U.S. at 506-07. We do not overturn the district court's finding of an alternative forum. That an alternative forum exists, however, is not dispositive in the balancing required in a *forum non conveniens* analysis.

The second relevant private interest factor the district court failed to examine is that the parties were ready for trial when it dismissed the complaint for *forum non conveniens*. The discovery deadline had passed; all documents needed for trial had been exchanged and/or identified; and all necessary trial documents were located in Tucson, Arizona. The central purpose of any *forum non conveniens* inquiry is to ensure that the trial is convenient. *Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. at 256; *La Seguridad v. Transytur Line*, 707 F.2d at 1307. That trial preparation had progressed nearly to the point of trial certainly was a relevant factor when the district court considered whether trial of the case in Arizona would have been more "easy, expeditious and inexpensive" than trial in the Philippines. *See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert*, 330 U.S. at 508. Although no single factor is dispositive, we conclude that the district court's failure to weigh these private interest factors was an abuse of discretion.

We also observe that the private interest factors mentioned by the district court do not strongly support the defendants' position on *forum non conveniens*. The district court noted that "the vast majority of the witnesses reside in the Philippines. . . ." *Gates Learjet II*, slip op. at 9. The defendants, however, admit that the district court was not absolutely correct. In fact, 23 of the 44 witnesses, whom the parties designated in response to interrogatories, reside in the Philippines, which is hardly a "vast majority."

Furthermore, the district court improperly focused on the number of witnesses in each location. Instead, the court should have examined the materiality and importance of the anticipated witnesses' testimony and then determined their accessibility and convenience to the

forum. *See La Seguridad v. Transytur Line*, 707 F.2d at 1308-09; *Thomson & McKinnon v. Minyard*, 291 F.Supp. 573, 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). We also note that a district court should keep in mind that "the increased speed and ease of travel and communication . . . makes, especially when a key issue is the location of witnesses, no forum 'as inconvenient [today] as it was in 1947,'" when the Supreme Court decided *Gilbert*. *Manu International, S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc.*, 641 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1981). We are not convinced that the court here properly considered and weighed this private interest factor. We therefore cannot give much deference to the district court's consideration of it.[5]

2. PUBLIC INTEREST FACTORS

In its consideration of public interest factors, the district court concluded that the Philippines "has a substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation." It reasoned that "most of the operating facts occurred in the Philippines," and that "[t]he controversies will require the application of Arizona law and Philippine law." *Gates Learjet II*, slip op. at 10. Public interest factors properly considered include "the local interest in having localized controversies resolved at home," and "the interest in hav-

---

[5] In its discussion of private interest factors, the district court also noted that "almost all of the acts alleged in the complaints and counterclaims occurred in the Philippines." This observation, however, seems to pertain to the Philippines' interest in the action, which is a public interest factor. If the district court was instead referring to the convenience of obtaining certain evidence, it failed to explain what evidence was unavailable. As discussed above, most trial materials were located in Arizona at the time the district court dismissed counts one and four for *forum non conveniens*.

ing the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is familiar with the law that must govern the action." *Cheng v. Boeing Co.*, 708 F.2d at 1410.

We nevertheless conclude that the district court's consideration of these public interest factors rested on a mistaken assumption about the applicable law and improperly ignored the advantages of an Arizona forum for the trial. In noting that both Philippine and Arizona law applied to this matter, the district court apparently conconsidered all four counts of the Gates complaint. The defendants' motion to dismiss for *forum non conveniens*, however, could pertain only to counts one and four because the court had already dismissed counts two and three for lack of personal jurisdiction.

Counts one and four allege unauthorized use and a conspiracy to make unauthorized use of Gates' tradename and trademark. These counts involve an interpretation of the international distributorship agreement entered into between Gates and LPI. Under the heading, "Post-Termination Actions," the distributorship agreement provides:

> The Distributor shall immediately discontinue the use of any trade names or trademarks referred to in Article III above and shall make no further use of the same nor any other name, title, expression or mark so nearly resembling such trade names or trademarks as to be deceptive in nature.

The distributorship agreement also specifically provides that it shall be governed by Arizona law. Thus, counts one and four apparently are contract actions that require the application of Arizona law, not Philippine law.[6]

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[6] Defendants implicity admit this point, conceding that Arizona law would apply to a contract action.

In addition to making a mistaken assumption about the applicable law, the district court failed to weigh Arizona's interests in having the controversy "resolved at home." Arizona has a significant interest in interpreting its own laws. *See Cheng v. Boeing Co.*, 708 F.2d at 1411. Arizona also has an interest in protecting its companies from trademark infringement abroad to preserve the state's economic vitality. Although the situs of the alleged trademark and tradename infringement was the Philippines, it appears that Philippine law is not applicable. We therefore conclude that these public interest factors should not weigh heavily in defendants' favor. A proper understanding of the applicable law and the relative interests, in fact, suggests that Arizona has the more substantial interest in this litigation.

The district court particularly emphasized one public interest factor: the docket congestion of its court. It stated:

> Counsel have indicated that there are hundreds, if not thousands, of exhibits involved. There will be many witnesses testifying for both sides. The case will take weeks to try. The Tucson division of the District of Arizona is presently operating with two district judges. Normally there are three judges in the division. The two judges are handling all of the criminal calendar. Outside judges have been assigned to handle part of the civil calendar and it is contemplated that more help will be necessary in the future.

Gates Learjet II, slip op. at 10.

This factor also should not weigh heavily in defendants' favor. The real issue is not whether a dismissal will reduce a court's congestion but whether a trial may be

speedier in another court because of its less crowded docket. *See Starnes v. McGuire*, 512 F.2d 918, 932 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc); 15 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, *Federal Practice & Procedure* § 3854 at 289-91 (1976); *see also Foster v. Litton Industries, Inc.*, 431 F.Supp. 86, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1977 (relative docket conditions accorded some, but not decisive, weight in transfer motions). The district court here observed only that its dockets was congested; it did not determine whether a trial would be speedier in the Philippines. Even if it were, however, it is unfair for a court to subject a United States corporation to the courts of another country merely because plaintiff's home country courts are congested. The *forum non conveniens* doctrine should not be used as a solution to court congestion; other remedies, such as placing reasonable limitations on the amount of time each side may have to present evidence, are more appropriate.

We hold that the district court failed to consider relevant private and public interest factors and misconstrued others. The district court therefore abused its discretion. On balance, we conclude that the relevant private and public interest factors support the district court's retention of jurisdiction and the dismissal of defendants' *forum non conveniens* motion.

III. CONCLUSION

Gates cannot demonstrate that the defendants had sufficient activity in Arizona to establish general jurisdiction. Under the *Data Disc* three-prong inquiry into limited jurisdiction, however, we hold that the district court erred in dismissing counts two and three for lack of personal jurisdiction. As to the district court's dismissal

of counts one and four for *forum non conveniens*, we find an abuse of discretion. The district court's orders are therefore

REVERSED AND THE CASE IS REMANDED.

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION, *Plaintiffs,*	)	
vs.	)	**NO. CIV 82-139-TUC-ACM**
JAMES B. JENSEN, JR.,; RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a corporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation, and HAMIX INTERNATIONAL LTD., a corporation, *Defendants.*	)	**RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC'S MOTION TO DISMISS**

Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby respond to defendant James B. Jensen & Co., Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss. This Response is based on the attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Defendant James B. Jensen & Co., Inc. (hereinafter "Jensen, Inc.") objects to an Arizona Court's exercise of jurisdiction over it. In doing so, Jensen, Inc. is indulging in a corporate shell game in an attempt to confuse the Court and avoid proper exercise of its jurisdiction.

An examination of James B. Jensen's Answers to Interrogation, his Affidavit, and the Affidavit of Larry McDonough, attached hereto as Exhibit L, show that Mr. Jensen made numerous trips to Tucson, Arizona for various reasons, including the negotiation of the contract which established the relationship between the parties to this lawsuit. Mr. Jensen claims that all these visits were on behalf of Learjet Philippines, Inc., rather than Jensen, Inc. It can be safely assumed that if service had been obtained upon Learjet Philippines, Inc., he would be claiming that all the visits were on behalf of Jensen, Inc., a claim which would be supported by the evidence. The spuriousness of Mr. Jensen's claim that the early visits were on behalf of an entity other than Jensen, Inc. is made obvious by the recognition that Learjet Philippines did not even exist at the time of the early visits. Furthermore, all correspondence between the Parties was to and from James B. Jensen, as President of Jensen, Inc. *See* correspondence attached hereto as Exhibits A through F. Many of these letters refer to trips made by Jensen to Tucson and regard discussions which occurred at that time.

Finally, Jensen maintains that Learjet Philippines, Inc. and Jensen, Inc. are separate and distinct companies and that the latter had no contact with Tucson. However, an examination of correspondence from Learjet Philippines, Inc., shows that James B. Jensen, Inc. is the mailing address of Learjet Philippines, Inc. *See* Exhibit H attached hereto. Mr. Jensen, as President of Learjet Philippines, Inc., refers to James B. Jensen & Co., Inc. as "our San Francisco office" and "our U.S. Affiliate company". *See* Exhibit I attached hereto. A later letter from Mr. Jensen, as President of Learjet Philippines, Inc.,

again refers to James B. Jensen & Co., Inc. as "our San Francisco office" and asks that Learjet Philippines' mail be sent there. *See* Exhibit J attached hereto. Finally, Mr. Jensen, as President of Learjet Philippines, Inc., refers to James B. Jensen & Co., Inc. as its "U.S. purchasing arm". *See* Exhibit K attached hereto.

Evidently, the filing of this lawsuit has made these two corporate entities suddenly separate and distinct, at least in the mind of Mr. Jensen. It is readily apparent, however, from examination of the attached documents that:

A. Mr. Jensen, on behalf of Jensen, Inc., transacted business in the State of Arizona; and

B. That Mr. Jensen used Jensen, Inc. and Learjet Philippines, Inc. interchangeably with total disregard of separate corporate identities.

Therefore, James B. Jensen, Jr., President of James B. Jensen & Co., Inc. has been in Arizona on numerous occasions negotiating contracts with plaintiffs, attending distributor's conferences put on by plaintiffs, accepting delivery of merchandise from the plaintiffs in performance of contracts, etc. *See* Affidavits of Lawrence McDonough and James B. Jensen, James B. Jensen's Answers to Interrogatories and correspondence attached hereto. The agreement which underlies the dispute out of which this action arose was substantially negotiated in Tucson by Mr. Jensen. *See* contract attached as Exhibit A to the Complaint. Indeed, Mr. Jensen, on behalf of Jensen, Inc., came to Tucson and initiated the relationship with plaintiffs. *See* letters attached hereto as Exhibits A through G. Such solicitation of a contract or

transaction establishes that a party "purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities" within a state. *Hanson v. Denckla,* 376 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S. Ct. 1228, 1239, 2 L.Ed. 1283 (1958). *See also Empire Abrasive Equipment Corp. v. H. H. Watson, Inc.,* 567 F.2d 554, 559 (3rd Cir. 1977); *Bernard Brothers, Inc. v. Pride Manufacturing, Inc.,* 427 F.2d 297, 391 n.9 (3rd Cir. 1970).

It should also be noted that Article XI in the aforementioned Contract, which is entitled Applicable Law, states "It is expressly agreed and understood that this agreement is an *Arizona* agreement and that it shall be governed by the laws of the State of Arizona of the United States of America in all matters, including, but not limited to, validity, obligation, interpretation, construction, performance and termination." (emphasis added) It is well settled that such choice of law provisions in a contract militate in favor of jurisdiction by the chosen state. *See Southwest Offset, Inc. v. Hudco Publishing Company,* 622 F.2d 149, 152 (5th Cir. 1980) and *Product Promotions, Inc. v. Cousteau,* 495 F.2d 483, 498 N.27 (5th Cir. 1974). *See Also O'Hara International Bank v. Hampton,* 437 F.2d 1173, 1177 (7th Cir. 1971) which held:

> "The fact that the guarantee was to be construed according to Illinois law . . . clearly demonstrates that the defendants 'invoked the benefits and protection of the state.' "

Similarly, the Court in *Alchemie International, Inc. v. Metalworld, Inc.,* 523 F.Supp. 1039 (D.N.J. 1981) found such a choice of law provision to be strong evidence of the existence of jurisdiction. The Court there stated·

> "I judge Metalworld was on such notice here when it solicited a contract of this size, with an explicit New Jersey choice of law provision from a known resident of the state of New Jersey. If it then wished to ensure that it would not be exposed to litigation in New Jersey, the choice of forum provision could have been negotiated; absent such provision, Metalworld should reasonably have anticipated being hauled into court in the state." *Id.* at 1054 (D.N.J. 1981).

Jurisdiction was upheld in that case which involved a defendant with far less contact to the forum than defendant Jensen, Inc. has with Arizona.

CONCLUSION

It is clear from an examination of the record that jurisdiction over defendant Jensen, Inc. can properly be exercised in the State of Arizona. Mr. Jensen, as President of Jensen, Inc. came to Arizona and negotiated contracts and engaged in other business activities. After Learjet Philippines was incorporated, Jensen, Inc. became a U.S. Affiliate and San Francisco office and continued with its contact with plaintiffs here in Tucson.

It should be pointed out that in a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the Plaintiff needs only a prima facie showing of jurisdiction through its affidavits and supporting material. Such a prima facie showing suffices, notwithstanding any controverting presentation by the moving party, to defeat the motion. *Visual Sciences, Inc. v. Integrated Communications, Inc.*, 600 F.2d 56 (Second Cir. 1981); *Data Disc, Inc. v. Systems Technology Associates*, 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977); *United States v. Montreal Trust Company*, 358 F.2d 239, 245 (Second Cir. 1966). This has clearly been done. Ac-

cordingly, it is respectfully requested defendant's Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Jurisdiction be denied.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of July, 1982.

BILBY, SHOENHAIR, WARNOCK & DOLPH, P.C.

By WILLIAM H. TINNEY
P. O. Box 871
Tucson, Arizona 85702
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Copy of the foregoing mailed this
2nd day of August, 1982, to:
Gary F. Howard, Esq.

MOLLOY, JONES, DONAHUE, TRACHTA,
CHILDERS & MALLAMO, P.C.
2200 Arizona Bank Plaza
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EXHIBIT A

TELEX RCA
SAN FRANCISCO 278-259
MANILA 722-2097

TELEPHONE
(415) 956-2055

JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC.
IMPORTERS EXPORTERS
735 MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 1626
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104

March 1, 1978

Gates Learjet Export Corporation
P. O. Box 11186
Tucson, Arizona 85734

Attention: Mr. Finn Hedlund
Vice President Marketing

Dear Mr. Hedlund:

It was a pleasure meeting you early this week, and I wish to thank you for having given me the opportunity to express my desire to actively sell Gates Learjets in the Philippines.

As I mentioned, we have been active in business between the United States and the Philippines for the past 33 years, where we have specialized in supplying industrial and plant equipment and spare parts involving the sugar, cement, logging, light & power, and fertilizer industries, as well as various other industries.

Because of my personal interest in aviation, we began an active participation in this industry approximately four years ago, and within this time, we have developed a capability for selling aircraft and aircraft spares in the Philippine market. A particularly good relati hip I

have had within this period has been with Mr. Landis Carr and AiResearch Aviation, with whose cooperative effort we have sold three Merlins, one F-27F Executive, and one Turbo Commander aircraft. We have also sold various other aircraft, including a new Cessna Golden Eagle, and now, one of your Gates Learjet products.

We have a Philippine associate company, Aviation Specialist, Inc., which I personally own, which is completely staffed and operates locallling in the Philippines, dealing exclusively in aircraft sales and aircraft parts.

We have been successful in developing aircraft spares sales also, as a result of presently being the only operation in the Philippines with offices at the airport hangar area, as well as having offices in San Francisco with personnel knowledgeable about spares sources, thereby permitting us to service AOG requirements better and faster than anyone else in the Philippines.

We will have access to Learjet 36A, Serial No. 36, as well as the crew and mechanics of that aircraft who are considered as the cream of the crop in the General Aviation field in the Philippines. I also have on my staff as consultant, Capt. Ricardo Tomacruz, formerly a Vice President and Chief Pilot of the companies of General Hans Menzi. He has recently left those companies and is presently associated with me. Your Mr. James Bir knows Capt. Tomacruz and is familiar with his qualifications and competence with the Gates Learjet aircraft.

We are certain we can maximize sales of your aircraft in the Philippines, as we have strong personal contacts with the pilots' groups as well as the heads of industry and government, who are the potential buyers of the aircraft.

Our present forecast is a sale of four Gates Learjet aircraft in a 24-month period. Furthermore, I have formulated plans related to the sale to the Philippine government, and the success of this program would have highly productive results. This potential sale is in addition to the four units I have forecast for sale to business and industry.

We are most anixous to get underway with a sales program, needing only word from you that we can actively sell your products in the Philippine market.

We thank you for your past cooperation, and we look forward to future dealings with your company.

Yours very truly,
JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC.

By JAMES JENSEN, JR.
President

JJJR/lja

EXHIBIT B

Gates Learjet Export Corporation
p.o. box 11186 tucson, arizona 85734 (602) 294-4422 telex 666408

6 March 1978

Ref.: L-820-03-78-376
Mr. James B. Jensen, Jr.
President
James B. Jensen & Co., Inc.
235 Montgomery Street, Suite 1626
San Francisco, California 94104

Dear Mr. Jensen:

I want to take this opportunity to thank you for the valuable help you gave us recently on the sale of Learjet 36A-36.

It was a pleasure for all of us to have you here in Tucson last week, and to discuss with you how possibly our future business may be conducted in the Philippines.

I have read, with interest, your description of your businesses in the Philippines and California, and your experience and involvement in various areas of the aviation industry. Your access to 36A-36, as well as to its pilots and mechanics, constitutes an important ingredient of a future Learjet distributorship.

I agree with you that if we go after new business in a more constructive manner, and challenge Beechcraft domination in the Philippines, we can accomplish much more than has been accomplished in the past.

A decision relating to the appointment of a distributor in the Philippines will be made shortly. I promise to be in touch with you.

Sincerely,

FINN HEDLUND

FIH/dc
cc: J. E. Bir
S. W. Blankenship
R. E. Cloughley
J. M. Traisnel

EXHIBIT C

TELEX RCA
SAN FRANCISCO 278-259
MANILA 722-2097

TELEPHONE
(415) 956-2088

JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC.
IMPORTERS EXPORTERS
735 MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 1626
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104

March 20, 1978

Gates Learjet Export Corporation
P.O. Box 11186
Tucson, Arizona 85734

Attention: Mr. Finn Hedlund
Vice President Marketing

Dear Mr. Hedlund:

Regarding your request for a Philippine reference who could attest to our integrity and capability, I will request Mr. Roberto T. Villanueva, Chairman of the largest Philippine construction company, A.G.&P., Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co. to send you a communication. He is also the chairman of PDCP, Private Development Corporation of the Philippines, a large development bank as well as of BISCOM, Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., the largest sugar mill in the Far East.

We have known and been associated with Mr. Villanueva for more than thirty years.

Mr. Villanueva is a fine gentlemen of international stature who in his travels has no problems securing appointments to meet with such people as David Rockefeller at Chase Manhattan, Agnelli of Fiat, etc. In the

Philippines, he is well respected as an industrialist, banker, and economist.

For your information, I sold his sugar mill BISCOM a new Cessna 421-B Golden Eagle in 1976. This aircraft is shared by his group of companies and with their expanding construction contracts in Saudi Arabia and the recent forming of their new company A.G.&P. Saudi, I have them as a candidate for a Learjet in 1979. Furthermore their chief pilot was hired through my recommendation and enhances my position by having loyal support from the owners as well as the pilot.

I contacted Mr. Villanueva's office today and understand that he is on a short trip but expected to return sometime next week. He will send you a communication as soon as he returns.

I am enclosing a brochure of A.G.&P. as well as a recent annual report.

I can secure other references if necessary, such as Mr. Emilio Abello, Chairman of Manila Electric Company, the largest Philippine corporation in equity. He is also Chairman of P.C.I.B., Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, a very large Philippine private commercial bank. Your firm may also contact him directly.

I have prepared my list of prospective Learjet clients and will provide you complete details when appropriate including when sales to them can be contemplated. I will furnish you details on their activities and provide you their annual report if available. In almost all cases I have personal contacts with their principal officers as well as their pilots.

We are ready for an all-out effort to sell and promote Learjets in the Philippines and need only word from your company to proceed with my plans. Learjet 36-A S/N 36 will be arriving in Manila this Thursday and will be of great help in my promotions.

We thank you for your past cooperation and we look forward to future business with your company.

Yours very truly,
JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC.

JAMES JENSEN, JR.
President

JJJR:lja
Encl. as stated

EXHIBIT D

TELEX RCA
SAN FRANCISCO 278-259
MANILA 722-2097

TELEPHONE
(415) 956-2055

JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC.
IMPORTERS EXPORTERS
735 MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 1626
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104

May 4, 1978

Mr. Finn Hedlund
Gates Learjet Export Corporation
P.O. Box 11186
Tucson, Arizona 85734

Dear Mr. Hedlund:

Enclosed please find International Distributor Agreement duly signed, prospect review as well as other data which you might find of interest.

A spec sheet with prices was given to me by the chief pilot and head of the aviation department of Ayala Corporation. This relates to the Citation II which Heli-Orient has earmarked for their purchase. I have attempted to halt this transaction and have them consider a Learjet and I have the cooperation of the chief pilot as well as the corporate finance man but they also tell me that they are uncertain as to how deeply their president has made a verbal commitment. Apparently no effort had been made by the former Learjet distributor and I am a bit late but doing my utmost to salvage the situation. This would normally have a fairly easy sale as the president of Ayala Corporation, Mr. Enrique Zobel de Ayala is a proficient pilot.

Re Marinduque Mining, you will find enclosed a newspaper clipping showing their poor corporate performance for the past two years. Although we know the chief pilot, we have not been able to contact him as he is out of the country. An executive secretary has told us confidentially that management people have been avoiding meeting with the Cessna people although she mentions that some deposit has been made. We will revert to this shortly but it seems that this company will be out of the picture related to purchasing an aircraft for a while.

We are actively promoting the sale of Learjets and we expect to be able to show some accomplishments in the very near future.

Sincerely,
JIM JENSEN

JJJR/lja
Encl.

EXHIBIT E

TELEX RCA
SAN FRANCISCO 278-259
MANILA 722-2097

TELEPHONE
(415) 956-2055

JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC.
IMPORTERS EXPORTERS
735 MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 1626
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104

May 19, 1978

Mr. Finn Hedlund
Gates Learjet Export Corporation
P.O. Box 11186
Tucson, Arizona 85734

Dear Mr. Hedlund:

You will find enclosed a copy of list of corporations as well as chief executives or aviation department heads who we feel should be sent a copy of Contrails. We have sent a copy of this list to Mr. Dave Wodraska.

Also enclosed is a copy of letter sent me by Ricardo Tomacruz regarding follow up on prospective Learjet customers. We will continue to explore how to discourage Col. Zobel from continuing with taking delivery on the Citation II and hope that there might be a long delay in meeting deliveries which would enable him to back out from his commitment. To my knowledge, no money has yet changed hands.

We will continue to provide you with up to date information and we hope that we will have news of a better nature in the very near future.

Sincerely,
JAMES JENSEN, JR.

JJJR/lja

P.S. I am returning the blue copy of the International Distributor Agreement with my initials affixed per your request. Many thanks.

EXHIBIT F

TELEX RCA
SAN FRANCISCO 278-259
MANILA 722-2097

TELEPHONE
(415) 956-2055

JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC.
IMPORTERS EXPORTERS
735 MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 1626
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104

May 22, 1978

Mr. Finn Hedlund
Gates Learjet Export Corporation
P.O. Box 11186
Tucson, Arizona 85734

Dear Mr. Hedlund:

You will find enclosed our confidential list of prospective Learjet clients in the Philippines. Some on this list are prospects with a potential for making an immediate purchase whereas others are potential buyers within two or three years. In other words, this list covers prospective purchasers for the coming three to five years; there should be very few companies or individuals coming up in the near future who could be added to this list.

Our marketing program is geared to interesting these companies or individuals into purchasing a Learjet as management tools or for whatever purpose it might suit them.

As the interest in their possibly purchasing a Learjet increases, we will keep you informed so that we can maximize our efforts towards an eventual sale.

We trust that this list will provide you with an accurate evaluation of the potential of the Philippine market. Bear in mind, however, that the continued growth of the local economy is essential towards the success of marketing the Learjets in the Philippines and we do hope that we will be blessed with those necessary ingredients.

We thank you for your past cooperation and your faith in us, and we look forward to many years of fruitful cooperation.

Sincerely,
JAMES JENSEN, JR.

JJJR/lja

EXHIBIT G

TELEX RCA
SAN FRANCISCO 278-259
MANILA 722-2097

TELEPHONE
(415) 956-2055

JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC.
IMPORTERS EXPORTERS
735 MONTGOMERY STREET, SUITE 1626
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA 94104

May 25, 1978

Mr. Stanley W. Blankenship
Gates Learjet Corporation
Mid-Continent Airport
P. O. Box 1280
Wichita, Kansas 67201

Dear Stanley:

Enclosed you will find copies of the pictures I took of your Learjet stand during your recent visit to Manila.

I am also enclosing a copy of a recent letter I sent Mr. Finn Hedlund regarding the status of the Philippine market as well as a list of prospective clients with whom we have or will be exerting sales efforts.

We enjoyed working together with you and I personally value the fact that I found a friend in the Learjet family.

Sincerely,
JAMES JENSEN, JR.

EXHIBIT H

LEARJET / PHILIPPINES, INC.
prescon strata 100 bldg., suite 10h, emerald ave., pasig,
metro manila, Philippines
tel. 693-4259 or 693-4260 • telex (RCA) 722-2097

16 December 1980

MR. PHIL LOVETT
Senior Vice-Pres., Marketing
Gates Learjet Export Corporation
P. O. Box 11186
Tucson, Arizona 85734

Dear Mr. Lovett:

We are in receipt of your letter of December 1, 1980, and noted your request extending the 1980 International Distributors Agreement with GLEC from its current expiration date until April 30, 1980.

Mr. James Jensen, Jr., is presently on a South East Asian tour and will be proceeding from Hong Kong to San Francisco for the christmas holidays to visit his mother. Upon his return we shall transmit our formal conformity with his signature, as stated in your letter.

May we reiterate our standing request to expedite mail to us that "All correspondence and brochures should be marked – HOLD FOR THE POUCH TO THE PHILIPPINES – and be sent to the following address:

LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC.
c/o James B. Jensen & Co., Inc.
235 Montgomery St., Suite 1626
San Francisco, California 94104

Very truly yours,
LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC.
RICARDO S. TOMACRUZ
Vice Pres. & Gen. Manager

RST/ngm

NCC hangar, manila domestic airport, manila, philippines
tel. 828-31-32

EXHIBIT I

LEARJET / PHILIPPINES, INC.
prescon strata 100 bldg., suite 10h, emerald ave., pasig,
metro manila, Philippines
tel. 693-4259 or 693-4260 • telex (RCA) 722-2097

12 October 1978

Mr. D. B. Norton, Vice President, Product Support
Gates Learjet Corporation
P. O. Box 7707
Wichita, Kansas 67277

Dear Mr. Norton:

I have been informed by our San Francisco office of JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., that your office has not yet established a discount policy for our firm.

I wish to request that your firm grant Learjet Philippines, Inc. and our U.S. affiliate company James B. Jensen & Co., Inc. the customary discounts you normally extend to your international distributors.

You will find enclosed xerox copy of GLEC infogram Ref.: BA-78-78 dated 23 August 1978 referring to GLEC list of distributors as well as copy of page 6 of that Infogram referring to our being the distributor for the Philippines.

You will also find enclosed xerox copy of a request for bids from James B. Jensen & Co., Inc., ref. ASI-137-9 requesting for a price and delivery on a fuel control computer.

Please advse if we would be entitled to a discount on

the purchase of this item; also please advise your general discount schedule on proprietary and non-proprietary items.

Thank you for your attention to this request.

Yours very truly,
LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC.
JAMES JENSEN, JR.
President

JJJR/ngm
encl.

NCC hangar, manila domestic airport, manila, philippines
tel. 83-31-32

EXHIBIT J

LEARJET / PHILIPPINES, INC.
prescon strata 100 bldg., suite 10h, emerald ave., pasig,
metro manila, Philippines
tel. 693-4259 or 693-4260 • telex (RCA) 722-2097

11 February 1981

Mr. Lawrence McDonough
Gates Learjet Export Corporation
P. O. Box 11186
Tucson, Arizona 85734

Dear Larry:

> We confirm our telex of February 4, 1981 as follows: "Your letter November 25, 1980 only received now. We assure you we would not involve ourselves in the Hedlund controversy or possible court case between Gates Learjet and Hedlund. As your distributor we value not only the good relationship we have built but also our dedicated loyalty to the company. Our letter to Lovett a mere statement of some grievance, definitely not directed against Gates Learjet. Past performance will attest we have always exerted utmost efforts as distributor. We are committed to act only for the best interest of Gates Learjet. Letter follows."

Permit us to elaborate on the transaction of the 35A-338 which is the crux of our letter to Mr. Lovett.

Our 35A-338 slot was made possible thru the kind assistance of Mr. Hedlund when he visited us in Manila last August 1979 while still connected with GLEC. We do not deny that in our dealings with Mr. Hedlund he has

become not only a business associate due to his position at GLEC but also a personal friend. A copy of our letter to Mr. Lovett was given him against this background and there was never the intention of the same being used as a basis for any action against Gates Learjet.

NCC hangar, manila domestic airport, manila, philippines
tel. 83-31-32

LEARJET / PHILIPPINES, INC.
prescon strata 100 bldg., suite 10h, emerald ave., pasig,
metro manila, Philippines
tel. 693-4259 or 693-4260 • telex (RCA) 722-2097

Mr. Lawrence McDonough
Gates Learjet Export Corp.
Page 2 . . . .

Except for the unpleasant incident concerning the 338 delivery which we have considered as an isolated case, we as distributor, have nothing but high praise and regard in our dealings with Gates Learjet. This attitude has never been altered. As your distributor, we pledge to Gates Learjet our loyalty, and will continue to do so, in order to promote our mutual interests, well-aware that our previous efforts have been accorded due recognition, having been cited for outstanding achievement in the last Distributor's conference in September 1980.

We regret the 338 incident which continues to plague us. Our client who purchased the aircraft has complained to us in strong terms that they have to date not been able to place the aircraft in service due to registration problems still unresolved to their satisfaction. We hope to settle this issue, as the owner is our most valued client.

We are hopeful that with this communication, all matters shall have been duly clarified.

May we kindly reiterate our-previous request that mail for Learjet Philippines be sent to our San Francisco office, to wit:

LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC.
c/o James B. Jensen & Co., Inc.
Hearst Building Suite 422
Corner Market St. & Third St.
San Francisco, California 94103

HOLD FOR POUCH TO MANILA, PHILIPPINES

Very truly yours,

LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC.
JAMES JENSEN, JR.
President

JJJR/ngm
cc: Mr. Phil Lovett

NCC hangar, manila domestic airport, manila, philippines
tel. 83-31-32

EXHIBIT K

LEARJET / PHILIPPINES, INC.
prescon strata 100 bldg., suite 10h, emerald ave., pasig,
metro manila, Philippines
tel. 693-4259 or 693-4260 • telex (RCA) 722-2097

September 28, 1981

Mr. John Benson
Vice-President, International Marketing
Gates Learjet Export Corporation
P. O. Box 11186
Tucson, Arizona 85734

Dear Mr. Benson:

Thank you for your kind courtesies extended me in my trip to Tucson last September 21, 1981.

With regard to our discussion with you and Mr. Fahey relative to the Philippine territory, as well as the written check list given to me, enumerating distributor qualification requirements, we wish to assert added data in line with your requirements and for which we feel qualify us. We furthermore assert our desire to *continuously upgrade our organization as well as our facilities,* not only to render a *more than adequate support* for the present fleet, but also to prepare us for dynamic activity into the next decade.

As to our marketing activities, we make continuous efforts through *personal contacts* and brochures to keep both corporate heads as well as present pilots of turboprop aircraft informed of the capabilities and cost effectiveness of Learjet aircraft. On the pilot level, we involve

ourselves in the training flights of present Learjets, such as operations into a short, high altitude airport for purposes of constant development of pilot proficiency. On such training flights, we often times invite particular turboprop pilots to be on board as a means of creating insider support from among the professional pilot group. Our Mr. Tomacruz constantly arranges for these types of activities which contribute to pilot proficiency for present Learjet pilots and knowledge of product to the turboprop pilots who will perhaps be the next group of corporate Learjet pilots.

Besides our corporate offices at the Strata 100 Building in the Ortigas Commercial Center, we have facilities at NCC hangar at the Manila Domestic Airport area where we also base our *two full-time mechanics,* one of whom has a substantial experience in Learjet aircraft and possesses both a Philippine CAA license as well as an American FAA license as per enclosed bio-data.

In the field of spares support, Learjet Philippines as well as its U. S. purchasing arm, James B. Jensen & Co., Inc., purchased directly from Gates Learjet Corporation spares in the amount of U. S. dollars $75,544.68 in 1980 and $131,141.61 to date in 1981, all for its account in support of the Philippine fleet.

We have submitted the mechanics of the Forward Order Program to our Philippine attorneys for comment as to compliance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines as regards to foreign exchange, and we will revert as soon as they answer.

We welcome Mr. Michael Fahey to visit with us for constructive talks on his next trip to our part of the world,

and we look forward to a strengthening of ties to the benefit of our respective companies.

Yours very truly,

LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC.
By JAMES JENSEN, JR.
President

JJJr/lja

cc: Mr. B. S. Stillwell, General Manager
Encl. as stated

NCC hangar, manila domestic airport, manila, philippines
tel. 83-31-32

EXHIBIT L

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION *Plaintiffs,* vs. JAMES B. JENSEN, JR.; RICARDO TOMACRUZ; LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., a coporation; JAMES B. JENSEN & CO., INC., a corporation; HAMIX INTERNATIONAL LTD., a corporation *Defendants.*	**NO. CIV 82-139-TUC-ACM** **AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS**

LAWRENCE MCDONOUGH, of lawful age and being first duly sworn upon his oath, states:

I am the Secretary and General Counsel of Gates Learjet Corporation and I am thereby authorized to make this Affidavit on behalf of Gates Learjet Corporation.

I am personally familiar with JAMES B. JENSEN, JR. and I know of my own personal knowledge that MR. JENSEN has visited Gates Learjet's marketing facilities and manufacturing plant located on the Tucson International Airport in Tucson, Arizona, on many occasions for the purposes of transacting business with Gates Learjet Corporation within the state of Arizona.

In the spring months of 1978, MR. JAMES B. JENSEN, JR. conducted negotiations with various Gates Learjet personnel at the Gates Learjet marketing headquarters at 6868 South Plumer in Tucson, Arizona, in order to obtain Gates Learjet's appointment of MR. JENSEN and his Philippine corporation, LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC., as Gates Learjet's distributor for the country of the Republic of the Philippines. Thereafter, MR. JAMES B. JENSEN, JR. attended and participated in Gates Learjet Corporation's annual distributor conferences held at the Westward Look Resort in Tucson, Arizona, in September of 1978, September of 1979, and September of 1980. During such conference meetings, MR. JENSEN took part in discussions involving Gates Learjet Corporation personnel and personnel from various other Gates Learjet Corporation's distributors worldwide about Gates Learjet's products, methods of business, and methods of distribution of its product. MR. JENSEN also attended and took part in various social functions surrounding those distributor conferences.

On various occasions during 1978, 1979 and 1980, MR. JAMES B. JENSEN, JR. visited various Gates Learjet Corporation personnel at Gates Learjet Corporation's marketing headquarters and the manufacturing plants located on the Tucson International Airport at Tucson, Arizona, for the purpose of negotiating the purchase of Learjet aircraft, for the purpose of accepting delivery of such aircraft, and for the purpose of negotiating terms and conditions under which he would continue to serve as a Gates Learjet Corporation international distributor.

FURTHER affiant saith not.

LAWRENCE MCDONOUGH

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me
this 16th day of April, 1982.

DIANE SLAUGHTER
Notary Public

My Commisson expires: July 12, 1985

APPENDIX C

Gary F. Howard
MOLLOY, JONES, DONAHUE, TRACHTA,
CHILDERS & MALLAMO, P.C.
2200 Arizona Bank Plaza
33 North Stone Avenue
Post Office Box 2268
Tucson, Arizona 85702-2268
Telephone: (602) 622-3531
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterclaimants

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

GATES LEARJET CORPORATION and GATES LEARJET EXPORT CORPORATION, *Plaintiffs,*	)	**NO. CIV 82-139 TUC-ACM REPLY MEMORANDUM RE MOTION TO DISMISS**
vs.	)	
JAMES B. JENSEN. JR.; et al., *Defendants.*	)	
JAMES JENSEN, JR.; et al., *Counterclaimants,*	)	
vs.	)	
GATES LEARJET CORPORATION; et al., *Counterdefendants.*	)	

COME NOW Defendants/Counterclaimants, and for their Reply Memorandum regarding the Motion to Dismiss, submit the following:

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

As was said in the original Motion to Dismiss, Counterclaimants cannot *force* Counterdefendants to agree to litigate the Philippine-related claims in the Philippines. The Court may, on its own motion, be able to do that. But for purposes of this Memorandum, we will only discuss the Plaintiffs' claims against the Defendants. When the Court looks at the location of the witnesses on those claims, the issue of what law will be applied and the basic question of where those claims can most fairly and expediently be litigated, it would be unfair to suggest that the trial take place anywhere *but* the Philippines.

Before getting to those issues, though, Defendants would like to address the question of the current political situation in the Philippines. The dismissal contemplated by Defendants (and based on this Court's citation of *Cheng v. Boeing*, the Court is thinking along these lines as well) is a *conditional* dismissal. If the system of civil law in the Philippines deteriorates to the point that a trial cannot be had, then this Court can once again take jurisdiction of the claims Defendants do not, by making the suggestion, waive their objections to the exercise of this Court's jurisdiction over their persons. Defendants only mean that since the dismissal would be conditional, if Plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the progress they are making toward getting the case to trial in the Philippines, they can ask this Court to set aside the dismissal. That does *not* mean that this Court will somehow acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the Defendants that it did not otherwise have. The exercise of jurisdiction over the Defendants will still be governed by the principles of *International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington*, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.C. 154, 90 L. Ed. 95 (1945)

Plaintiffs stated in paragraphs I, II and III of their Opposition that Plaintiffs are residents of Arizona and their choice of forum is Tucson, Arizona; that Plaintiffs are doing business in Arizona, and that Arizona law applies.

Plaintiffs are foreign corporations authorized to do business in Arizona. However, Defendants/Counterclaimants contend that as part of the daily business activity of Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs by their own choosing enter into contratcual agreements with various countries throughout the world in order to promote and sell their product – Learjets. As part of that promotion, Plaintiffs enlist the assistance internationally by way of distributorship agreements. These contractual agreements are known as "International Distributor Agreements".

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a copy of a letter dated December 10, 1979, to James Jensen, Jr., forwarding for review and execution of the 1980 International Distributor Agreement, which *was executed* in the Philippines by Mr. Jensen, forwarded to GLC/GLEC and copy returned by mail to Mr. Jensen, as shown in the attached letter dated March 25, 1980 (see attached Exhibit "B").

Defendants/Counterclaimants do not disagree that Arizona laws applies to at least one of the Plaintiffs' claims (the breach of contract). But Defendants suggest that Arizona law can be applied in the Philippines, just as easily, as Philippine law as to Plaintiffs' other claims (e.g. interference with contractual relations) can be applied here. The law does not support Plaintiffs' argument on "choice of law." In *Piper Aircraft Company v. Reyno*, 454 U.S. 235, 102 S. Ct. 252, 70 L. Ed. 2d 419

(1981), the Supreme Court found that even though Scottish law may apply and may even have been less favorable to plaintiff, the District Court did not err in dismissing the matter under the doctrine of *forum non conveniens*.

A trial in Tucson would not be convenient for Defendants. Defendants/Counterclaimants have communicated with their counsel primarily through a telex service and/or long distance phone calls. Numerous affidavits have been secured through the Embassy of the Philippines and filed with this Court. In addition, Defendants/Counterclaimants have secured counsel in the Philippines in order to depose Messrs. Franco, Polotan, Rivera and Marcelo, all at considerable expense.

Plaintiffs have inundated Defendants/Counterclaimants with discovery motions and various pleadings, and when it became difficult to obtain the information requested, Plaintiffs would file then another motion to compel and/or ask for sanctions, knowing that counsel for Defendants/Counterclaimants would have a difficult time in securing documentation, etc. While all documentation was readily accessible to GLC/GLEC, the problem for Defendants/Counterclaimants' counsel communicating in excess of some 6,000 miles became quite a task for Defendants/Counterclaimants counsel. Upon receipt of documentation, if any questions were to be asked, it would have to be done either by long distance call and/or telex service. Information, witnesses and verification through the Embassy was not easily accessible for Defendants/Counterclaimants' counsel.

Some of the private interests factors in determining whether or not a case should be dismissed on grounds

of *forum non conveniens* include relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling and the costs of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, *Cheng v. Boeing Co.*, 708 F.2d 1406, 1410 (9th Cir. 1983).

The greater bulk of witnesses and exhibits are not located in the United States. All alleged acts actually occurred in the Philippines, with the exception of Count V of Defendants/Counterclaimants' Counterclaim. In their opposition, Plaintiffs set forth a "Witness List"; however, Defendants/Counterclaimants ask that the Court look to the Plaintiffs claims against the Defendants and where all the witnesses on those claims are located. Plaintiffs have omitted a number of witnesses listed in their answers to non-uniform interrogatories, to-wit:

1. General Ferdinande Marcos, Presidential Palace, Philippines, who will testify as to the reputation and standing of LPI and its principals.

2. Mrs. Monlopaz, Manila, Philippines, will testify as custodian of records for LPI and related matters.

3. Ruben Roya, employee of LPI, will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred and related matters.

4. Mr. Justimanio, employee of LPI will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred and related matters.

5. Renairio Paras, employee of LPI, will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred and related matters.

6. Rolando Alipio, employee of LPI, will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred and related matters.

7. Benedicto Corpus, employee of LPI, will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred and related matters.

8. General Menzi, Manila, Philippines, will testify as to the intereference of the sale of a Learjet (See attached Exhibits "C" through "H".)

All alleged acts of trademark enfringement and interference of contractual relations occurred in the Philippines, and most all witnesses that will testify to the alleged enfringement and interference are in the Philippines, and most all witnesses that will testify to Counterclaimants' interrogatories dated March 11, 1983, Plaintiffs stated in their response to Interrogatory No. 3, attached hereto as Exhibit "H", that Jensen, Tomacruz and LPI continued to use the tradename Learjet. Plaintiffs went on to further state "from their present information", which can only mean they had to depend on Philippine sources for this information, and not from any information received in the United States. If a conspiracy even existed, it existed in the Philippines and any alleged interference with Plaintiffs' contractual relationship is going to be tried under Philippine law.

As a further reason opposing dismissal, Plaintiffs attempt to try and use their own wrongdoing with the legal authorities in the Philippines to their advantage. If one travels to a foreign country and breaks that country's law, one must expect to bear the consequences of that country's jurisdiction. It is reasonable to assume

that, if Plaintiffs go into the Philippines or any other country and obey its laws, they will be treated as any other citizen of that country. Plaintiffs' raising of this issue is without merit in that that incident has nothing whatsoever to do with the issues before this Court and those claims were dismissed by this Court.

Plaintiffs refer to a waste of litigation resources. Plaintiffs' remarks are without justification. Since (a) all but one of the witnesses on Plaintiffs' Complaint are really located in the Philippines, (b) the alleged acts occurred in the Philippines, (c) Plaintiffs, as part of their daily business, chose to promote their product — Learjets — internationally, it is not unreasonable to have the trial of their claims take place in the Philippines.

Plaintiffs also allege that at the very least one of their attorneys would have to go to the Philippines for an extended period of time and, further, that all exhibits are contained in Tucson, Arizona, and Kansas. This hardly seems accurate since GLC/GLEC already have counsel in the Philippines who were present during the Franco, Rivera, Polotan and Marcelo depositions. All documentation provided by Defendants/Counterclaimants were derived from the files of Defendants/Counterclaimants located in the Philippines. *Even* as early as December 16, 1981 (two months *prior* to Plaintiffs filing this lawsuit), Plaintiffs were informed by Rolando Moscardon via telex that:

> ". . . I strongly recommend that lawyers with real clout be hired to work with, if not take over from Celso [GLC's then counsel in the Philippines]. While everyone feels you will eventually win both

> cases, delays that other side seems easily able to obtain from the court would cause you more damage."

Apparently even Moscardon, (who claims he was not appointed the Learjet distributor until October 1982, yet acted under an implied agreement,) felt Plaintiffs would win in the Philippines if lawyers with "real clout" were hired (see attached Exhibit "I").

Defendants/Counterclaimants have never agreed and do not now agree that this Court has jurisdiction over their person to hear Plaintiffs' claims against them. Therefore, if this Court were to grant this Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of *forum non conveniens,* the Plaintiffs would not really be losing that much. It is not at all clear that Plaintiffs will be able to convince the Court that the evidence at trial supports the exercise of jurisdiction over the person of even LPI, but there is certainly only the flimsiest evidence, if any, to support the exercise of jurisdiction over the persons of Messrs. Tomacruz and Jensen and Hamix International, Ltd. So, dismissal on the grounds of *forum non conveniens* may really be nothing more than bowing to the inevitable.

SUMMARY

The Plaintiffs' Complaint against Defendants should, by every test applicable, be tried in the Philippines. If it is Plaintiffs' wish that the Counterclaims all be tried in Arizona without the unnecessary delay and confusion caused by being intermingled with Plaintiffs' Complaints, then Plaintiffs may be entitled to have the Counterclaims tried here. That is more an issue between Plaintiffs and the Court. Counterclaimants really have no

right to insist that Counterdefendants submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the courts of the Philippines.

Respectfully submitted this 14th day of October, 1983.

MOLLOY, JONES, DONAHUE,
TRACHTA, CHILDERS &
MALLAMO, P.C.

By GARY F. HOWARD
Attorneys for
Defendants/Counterclaimants

COPY of the foregoing Reply Memorandum re
Motion to Dismiss mailed/delivered this
14th day of October, 1983, to:
William H. Tinney, Esq.
BILBY, SHOENHAIR, WARNOCK
& DOLPH, P.C.
Post Office Box 871
Tucson, Arizona 85702
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants
Gates Learjet Corporation and
Gates Learjet Export Corporation

EXHIBIT A

Gates Learjet Export Corporation
p.o. box 11186 tucson, arizona 85734 (602) 294-4422 telex 666408

Mr. James Jensen, Jr., President
LEARJET PHILIPPINES, INC.
Prescon Strata 100 Building, Suite 10-H
Emerald Avenue, Pasig
Metro Manila, Philippines

Dear Mr. Jensen:

I am pleased to forward for your review and execution the International Distributor Agreement for 1980.

In the Agreement, please do not overlook Article IV, Ownership and Management, which must be filled in. As you know, the "Amendment to the International Distributor Agreement" deals with the rules that apply in the event a new aircraft is resold within the six (6) month period following its delivery by Gates Learjet Corporation or Gates Learjet Export Corporation. If the Amendment is not returned to us with an indication of either acceptance or rejection, it will be deemed to have been rejected. In other words, you will not get the benefits of this amendment unless you write in "Accepted" and sign it.

As for the Distributor Business Plan for 1980, please provide as many details as possible to enable us to properly understand your plans for 1980 in the territory for which you are responsible.

Attachments "A" and "B" set the quota and the minimum number of sales personnel deemed necessary for your

territory. Please note that for 1980 the quota includes the 50 Series aircraft.

Please return original and copy of the Distributor Agreement, properly signed, as well as the applicable attachments so that I may sign and return your copy to you. We are looking forward to working with you and trust 1980 will be a successful year for your company and ours.

Sincerely,

FIH:cl

Enclosures:

International Distributor Agreement — Original and Copy
Amendment to International Agreement — Original and Copy
Distributor Business Plan — Original and Copy
Attachment "A" and "B" — Original and Copy

EXHIBIT B

Gates Learjet Export Corporation
p.o. box 11186 tucson, arizona 85734 (602) 294-4422 telex 666408

EXHIBIT 6

March 25, 1980
Mr. James Jensen, Jr.
Learjet Philippines, Inc.
235 Montgomery Street, Suite 1626
San Francisco, CA 94104

Dear Mr .Jensen:

We are pleased to return your executed copy of the International Distributor's Agreement for 1980.

We are looking forward to working with you and trust that 1980 will continue to be a successful year for your company and ours.

Sincerely yours,
J. M. Traisnel
Manager Administration
International Marketing

njp

Enclosure

EXHIBIT C

g. Ruben Roya, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

h. Colonel Mendaro, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

i. Mr. Justimanio, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

j. Renairio Paras, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

k. Rolando Alipio, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

l. Benedicto Corpus, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

m. David Crompton, principal of Stillwell Aviation. Will testify as to Stillwell Aviation's after sale support facilities, lack of involvement of B. S. Stillwell and Stillwell Aviation lack of jurisdiction over Stillwell Aviation, and related matters.

n. Tinsay, General Manager of Judatin Training. Will testify as to reputation of Learjet Philippines and its principals, and related matters.

Dated this 24th day of May, 1983.

Exhibit C Plaintiffs Supplement Answers to Defendants 1st Set of Interrogatories dated Mar. 24, 1983.

EXHIBIT D

Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby supplement its answers to Defendants' Non-Uniform Interrogatories (1st Set) as follows:

The address of all Gates Wichita employees heretofore identified is Post Office Box 7707, Wichita, Kansas 67277, 8220 West Harry, Wichita, Kansas 67209. Any of these witnesses will be made available to Defendants for the purposes of deposition without the necessity of subpoena upon reasonable notice to Plaintiffs' counsel.

The addresses of all the Philippine witnesses are in Defendants' possession and most of them are subject to a Court Order requiring Defendants to disclose them to Plaintiffs. If this is not the case, Plaintiffs will be happy to attempt to determine the address of any witnesses which does not fall within that category.

Michael Fahey, John Benson, and Marge Taylor are Gates employees located at 6868 South Plumer in Tucson, Arizona. Larry McDonough and Bib Stillwell are Gates employees located at 7777 Old Nogales Highway, Tucson, Arizona.

Mike Menardo is an ex-Gates employee currently living at 2601 Ashe, Apartment 501, Bakersfield, California 93309.

Lewis Jones is an ex-Gates employee currently located at Cooper Laboratories, Inc., Corporate Flights Operation Department, 222 East Carillo, Suite 300, Santa Barbara, California 93401.

R. E. Claughley is an independent consultant who can be reached at Combs-Gates Denver, Stapleton International Airport, Denver, Colorado 80207.

Exhibit D Plaintiffs Supplemental Answers to Defendants 1st Set of Interrogatories dated 6/21/83.

EXHIBIT E

Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby supplement its answers to Defendants' Non-Uniform Interrogatories (1st Set) as follows:

2. a. General Ferdinand Marcos, Presidential Palace, Manila, Philippines. Will testify as to the reputation and standing of Learjet Philippines and its principals, and related matters.

b. George Kriss, Gates Learjet Tucson. Kriss is the pilot who flew from San Francisco to Honolulu in a 55 series Gates Learjet. He will testify as to the long range capabilities of these planes, and related matters.

c. James S. Mederios, Gates Learjet Tucson — Senior Vice President in charge of product support service. Will testify as to after sale plane support requirements for Gates Learjets, and related matters.

d. Ray Pahls, Gates Learjet Tucson — Manager of service facilities. Will testify as to after sale claim support requirements for Learjets, and related matters.

e. Rolando Moscardon, Manila, Philippines, Learjet Philippines' successor (Western Pacific Aviation Corporation). Will testify as to Philippine market for business jets, after sale support policy of Gates Learjet Export Corporation, reputation of Learjet Philippines and its principals, Learjet Philippines intereference with sale of Learjets, and related matters.

f. Mrs. Monlopaz, Manila, Philippines. Will testify as custodian of records for Learjet Philippines, Inc. and related matters.

Exhibt E (2 pages) Plaintiffs Supplement Answers to Defendants Interrogatories (1st Set).

g. Ruben Roya, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

h. Colonel Mendaro, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

i. Mr. Justimanio, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

j. Renairio Paras, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

k. Rolando Alipio, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

l. Benedicto Corpus, employee of Learjet Philippines. Will testify as to work he did, pay he received, expenses incurred, and related matters.

m. David Crompton, principal of Stillwell Aviation. Will testify as to Stillwell Aviation's after sale support facilities, lack of involvement of B. S. Stillwell and Stillwell Aviation, lack of jurisdiction over Stillwell Aviation, and related matters.

n. Tinsay, General Manager of Judatin Training. Will testify as to reputation of Learjet Philippines and its principals, and related matters.

Dated this 24th day of May, 1983.

Exhibit ____ (2 pages) Plaintiffs Supplemental Answers to Defendants Interrogatories (1st Set)

EXHIBIT F

2. Identify (ref to introductory definitions for information you must supply to identify a person) all other witnesses, who, it is contemplated, may or will be called upon to testify in this action.

1. Michael Fahey.
2. Lewis Jones.
3. Mike Menardo.
4. Larry McDonough.
5. Bib Stillwell.
6. John Benson.
7. Finn Hedlund.
8. Ricardo Tomacruz.
9. James B. Jensen, Jr.
10. Defendants Philippine attorneys.
12. Quasha/Marcos (plaintiffs' Philippine attorneys).
13. De las Alas.
14. Antonio O'Campo, Financial Center Manila.
15 Such other witnesses as a continuing investigation will disclose.

(a) The general subject upon which each such person will testify; Witnesses numbered 1, 4, 10 and 13 will testify as to corporate damage, and the attachment of the airplane in the Philippines. Witnesses numbered 5 and 6 will testify as to telephone conversations with De las Alas and Quasha regarding the attachment in the Philippines and as to corporate damage. They will also

testify as to distributorship agreements, company policy as to same, and other topics involving plaintiff's corporate matters. Witnesses numbered 2 and 3 will testify as the attachment of the plane in the Philippines and as to corporate damage. Witness number 7 will testify as to topics unknown at this time. Witnesses number 8, 9 and 11 will testify as to their role in the Philippine attachment and judicial proceeding, as well as the trademark enfringement, breach of contract and abuse of contract counts of this Complaint. Witnesses number 12 and 14 will testify as to corporate damage. Witnesses number 1, 4, and 10 will testify as to Gates Learjet distributorship agreements, corporate policy as to same, and general corporate matters.

(b) State the relationship, if any, of each witness to you; Witnesses numbered 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 are employees of plaintiff. Witness number 7 is an ex-employee of plaintiff. Witnesses number 8, 9 and 10 are ex-distributors of plaintiffs. Witness number 9 is a special sales agent for plaintiffs. Witnesses number 12 and 13 are Philippine counsel.

EXHIBIT F

EXHIBIT G

Plaintiffs, pursuant to Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby supplement its answers to Defendants' Non-Uniform Interrogatories (1st Set) as follows:

2. General Hanz Menzi; Bill Vardaman (Gates-Wichita); and Ambassador Roberto S. Benedicto.

4. (d) Mockups and/or models of Gates Learjet Model 55, 55 ER, 55LR, 55 XLR and 56.

BILBY, SHOENHAIR, WARNOCK
& DOLPH, P.C.

By MICHAEL J. RUSING
P. O. Box 871
Tucson, Arizona 85702
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Copy of the foregoing mailed
this 25th day of April, 1983,
to:
Gary F. Howard, Esq.
MOLLOY, JONES, DONAHUE, TRACHTA,
CHILDERS & MALLAMO, P.C.
P. O. Box 2268
Tucson, Arizona 85702
Attorneys for Defendants

Exhibit G Plaintiffs Supplemental Answers dated April 25, 1983, to Defendants Interrogatories (1st Set).

EXHIBIT H

(b) Identify all documents referring or relating to and/or constituting said facts.

Purchase agreement for Hamix.

3. State all facts which form the basis of the allegation in paragraph 17 of your Complaint that "[t]he defendants 'Jensen', 'Tomacruz', 'Lear Phil', 'Jensen, Inc.', and 'Hamix' conspired to make unauthorized use of the trade mark and name of the plaintiff, the use of which tends to delude and confuse the public into believing that the defendants' business is in some way connected with the business of the plaintiff." As to such conspiracy, include in your answer, in addition to all other facts, at least the following details:

Jensen, Tomacruz, and Learjet Philippines continued to use the name Learjet in litigation, letterhead, and office identification. From present information, it appears that Jensen, Tomacruz, and Learjet Philippines are the co-conspirators.

(a) When the conspiracy was formed;

EXHIBIT H Plaintiffs Answers to Defendants Interrogatories dated March 11, 1983.

EXHIBIT I

(APPROXIMATE REPRODUCTION)

LEAR MKTG TUC

ATTN: M. FAHEY

AA – AS STATED ON THE PHONE ANS. BENEDICTO _____ HAVE _____ PRACTICALLY ALL ISSUES INCLUDING PRICE _____ EXCEPT THAT HE IS UNCONVINCED ON CAPA _____ OF GLEC TO UICK _____L ON SERVICE SUPPORT.

RECOMMEND GLEC MAKING FIRM COMMITMENTS ALONG FF. IDEAS THAT WILL GO WITH DISTRIBUTOR'S OWN COMMITMENTS:

(NOTE: RSB HAS BEEN DISAPPOINTED WITH SERVICE SUPPORT FOR ANY OF THE ACFT HE OWNS WHICH INCLUDES KING AIRS, MERLI___ BELL AND EN ISLA[illegible]ER ALSO SEES ABSENCE OF IN-COUNTRY LEAR SUPPORT.)

1. GLEC TO COMMIT TO SEND ONE ENGINEER UPON DELIVERY OF RSB LEAR FOR PERIOD OF 3 MONTHS TO ASSIST SETTING UP OF SERVICE CENTER FOR LEARS AND FURTHER TRAIN DISTRIBUTOR'S MECHANICS

WM GLEC TO HAVE SERVICE REP VISIT MANILA AT LEAST ONE A YEAR OR A WEEK OR TWO FOR SERVICE DEVELOPMENT.

3. _____ IT WITH TRADERS ROYAL BANK FOR DISTRIBUTOR'S ACCOUNT AN AMOUNT OF NOT LESS THAN 50,000 US D AS INITIAL REVOLVING FUND FOR LC TO COVER URGENT OR AOS ORDERS FOR PARTS NOT IN DISTRIBUTORS STOCK. (I HAVE APPLIED WITH CB FOR THIS REVOLVING LC WITH LIMIT OF USD 50,000 PER MONTH FOR KUSH ORDERS. OFFICIALLY THIS DEPOSIT SHALL BE REPLENISHED BY DISTRIBUTOR FROM SALES INCOME. PRIVATELY THIS AMOUNT MAY BE PROVIDED BY MY PARTY.

4. GLEC TO COMMIT TO DELIVER WITHIN X HOURS FROM RECEIPT ALL URGENT ORDERS (WITH EXCEPTIONS) PROVIDED RP IMPORT REGULATIONS ARE SATISFIED BY BUYER OR DISTRIBUTOR.

5. GLEC SHALL SEE TO IT THAT DISTRIBUTOR PARTS STOCKING AND OTHER SERVICE SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS ARE DULY COMPLIED.

6. ASSURANCE THAT ASSOCIATED SERVICE CENTERS SUCH AS STILWELL IN AUSTRALIA AND GARROX Q/PRO.4) TO LEND SUPPORT AND COOPERATION TO THE RP ORGANIZATION.

BB – SUGGEST THAT COMMITMENTS BE SUPPORTED WITH BOARD APPROVAL.

CC – SUGGEST PETTY CASH FUND FOR COURT CASES BE DEPOSITED TEMPORARILY THRU CITIBANK ACCOUNT NO. 00670677 CITIBANK N.A. MAKATI, M.M. OR YOU UTILIZE FACILITIES OF INA MANILA OFFICE FOR DISBURSEMENT CONTROL AND ACCOUNTING UPON UR RETURN. MEANWHILE AM SETTLING ACCOUNTS TO DATE FOR CUSTOMS GUARDING ETC.

DD – NOW THAT SUSPICION THAT INFLUENTIAL PEOPLE ARE BEHIND JENSEN/TOMACRUZ IS VALID I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT LAWYERS WITH REAL CLOUT BE HIRED TO WORK WITH, IF NOT TAKE OVER FROM, CELSO. WHILE EVERYONE FEELS YOU WILL EVENTUALLY WIN BOTH CASES, DELAYS THAT OTHER SIDE SEEMS EASILY ABLE TO OBTAIN FROM THE COURT COULD CAUSE YOU MORE DAMAGE. THIS SITUATION CAN BE NEUTRALIZED BY ANOTHER HIGH LEVEL POLITICALLY STRONG LAW FIRM. WILL SEND IN NAMES WHEN NEEDED.

R.P. MOSCAR

EXHIBIT I